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TAKINGS AND CAUSATION
Jan G. Laitos"
Constitutional protection of private property is grounded in a conflict-
between two legal principles--the government's power to regulate pri-
vate property for the common good and the Constitution's limit on this
power in the Takings Clause. The Takings Clause's check on government
power conforms to John Rawls's philosophy, which rejects the utilitarian
beliefs that government may act to achieve* the "good" of maximizing
human happiness and that government can force people to trade certain
political liberties for an improved distribution of wealth. Under Rawls's
theory, the principle of "justice as fairness" limits a government's ability
to require some people to bear burdens in order to advance public
goals, and the principle of "equal liberty" eventually leads to Pareto-
optimality.
In this Article, Professor Laitos notes that for many years, the United
States Supreme Court adopted a utilitarian perspective when it deferred
to legislative judgments furthering general public goals. Recently, howev-
er, the Court's Takings Clause jurisprudence has shifted markedly to-
ward Rawlsian theory. Under the Court's current jurisprudence, a gov-
ernment allocates burdens improperly if it singles out an impacted prop-
erty owner to bear the cost of a regulation, despite the fact that the
owner's property use did not cause the problem that the regulation ad-
dresses. Professor Laitos concludes that this causation test is not a per-
fect predictor of when laws work unconstitutional takings, but routine
application of the test to regulations affecting property should help
courts void unfair and unjust government rules that select from the pri-
vate sector convenient targets to pay for benefits for which the public
. John A. Carver, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
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should be responsible.
I. JOHN RAWLS AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
Constitutional protection of private property is grounded in a conflict
between two legal principles-the government's power to regulate pri-
vate property for the common good' and the Constitution's limit on this
power in the Takings Clause, which provides that "private property [shall
not] be taken for public use, without just compensation. ' The first prin-
ciple, government's power to restrict private property rights for the pub-
lic good, is consistent with utilitarianism, which condones redistribution
of private wealth in order to maximize societal happiness.3 The second
principle, reflected in the Takings Clause, prohibits certain regulations.
The Takings Clause's check on government power conforms to John
Rawls' philosophy.4 A Rawlsian approach to an organized society rejects
the utilitarian beliefs that government may act to achieve the "good" of
maximizing human happiness and that government can force people to
trade certain political liberties for an improved distribution of wealth.'
Under Rawls's theory, the principle of "justice as fairness" limits a
government's ability to require some people to bear burdens in order to
advance public goals, and the principle of "equal liberty" eventually
leads to Pareto-optimality.'
For many years, the United States Supreme Court adopted a utilitari-
an perspective when it deferred to legislative judgments furthering gener-
al public goals. To the extent that utilitarianism urges decisionmakers to
' See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962) (noting that
the state may interpose its authority on "'behalf of the public [if] the interests of the
public require such interference"') (quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137
(1894)).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413
(1922) (stating that although "some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and
must yield to the police power ... the implied limitation must have its limits").
' See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954) ("[T]he legislature ... is the
main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation."); JEREMY
BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 3 (1988) ("An action then
may be said to be comfortable to the principle of utility . . . when the tendency it has to
augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish it."). See
generally JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1957).
4 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
5 Id. at 60-63.
6 Id. at 31, 150-52; see infra note 396 (citing a source that discusses Pareto-
optimality).
360 [Vol. 5:2
TAKINGS AND CAUSATION
maximize society's happiness,7 the Court embraced the theory when' it
rejected takings claims that arose from three types of governmental ac-
tion: (1) "a public program that adjusts the benefits and burdens of eco-
nomic life to promote the common good"8; (2) a restriction on private
property that furthers "a legitimate state goal ' 9 or a "substantial public
purpose""°; or (3) a government decision "to protect the public interest
in health, the environment, [safety], and ... fiscal integrity."'" Judicial
deference to property-restrictive legislation designed to advance the
greater public interest followed another utilitarian principle that "the
most effective way to increase total happiness [within an organized soci-
ety] is to increase the average happiness. ' 2 Consistent with this princi-
ple, courts often do not consider takings to be regulations that limit prop-
erty uses because the property owners subject to the restrictions may
enjoy "an average reciprocity of advantage,1 3 which allows them to
"share with other owners the benefits ... of the [government's] exercise
of its police power."' 4
Some leading commentators on the Takings Clause endorsed judicial
adoption of utilitarian principles. 5 Recently, however, the Supreme
7 See, e.g., BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 3; HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF
ETHics 411, 415 (7th ed. 1907); J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM:
FOR AND AGAINST 7 (1973).
' Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508
U.S. 602, 643 (1993) (quoting Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,
225 (1986)); Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225.
9 Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 529 (1982).
10 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978) (citing
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
" Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488 (1987);
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136-37 (1894).
12 SMART & WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 28.
3 Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 415 (1922); Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491
(citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 144-50); see HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court,
542 P.2d 237, 246-47 (Cal. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
14 Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980); see Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438
U.S. at 134-35.
1" See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1214-15
(1967) (decisionmakers must decide if a proposed measure's "efficiency gains" (the net
gain of benefits over costs of government action) are greater than either "demoralization
costs" (damage to affected property owners' expectations due to a diminished sense of
security) or "settlement costs" (transaction costs incurred in reaching compensation
settlements with affected parties)); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74
YALE L.J. 36, 67 (1964) ("[W]hen the challenged act is an improvement of the public
condition through resolution of conflict within the private sector of the society, compen-
sation is not constitutionally required.").
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Court's takings jurisprudence has shifted markedly toward Rawlsian
theory.16 The change began in 1960, when the Court held in United
States v. Armstrong7 that the federal government had violated the Fifth
Amendment by taking private property without compensating its owners.
In Armstrong, the Court did not assume, consistent with utilitarian theo-
ry, that the federal government could take property from private parties
to improve the public condition without paying just compensation. 8
Rather, the Court adopted a rationale for the Takings Clause that is con-
sistent with Rawls's idea of "justice as fairness": "The Fifth
Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a
public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' 19
Since 1960, the Court frequently has cited this statement as an articu-
lation of "[t]he purpose"2 or "one of the principal purposes"2' of the
Takings Clause. Indeed, the Court has quoted Armstrong so often in
takings cases that some commentators believe that the statement "has
taken on the quality of a canonical recitation."22 The Court's rationale
in Armstrong, however, is not just an oft-repeated summary of why the
16 See generally Leigh Raymond, The Ethics of Compensation: Takings, Utility, and
Justice, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 577 (1996).
'7 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
The private property interests taken in Armstrong were valid materialmen's liens
that the United States rendered unenforceable. Id. at 44-49.
19 Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
20 Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986).
21 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987).
' Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72
U. DENVER L. REV. 859, 880 n.100 (1995). The Supreme Court cited the Armstrong
statement in the following opinions: Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384; Concrete Pipe & Prods.,
Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 646 (1993); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1071 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Christy
v. Lujan, 490 U.S. 1114, 1116 (1989) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 9 (1988); id. at 19 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 n.4; Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S.
587, 608 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 318-19 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
512-13 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Connolly, 475 U.S. at 227; United States v.
Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 106 n. 15 (1985); Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1,
14 n. 23 (1984); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449
U.S. 155, 163 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24
(1978); id at 140 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); and National Bd. of Young Men's Chris-
tian Ass'ns v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 89 (1969).
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Takings Clause prohibits the government from affecting private property
without paying just compensation. This rationale also reflects and ratifies
the two core tenets of Rawlsian theory---"equality" and "justice."
A. Fairness (Equality) and Justice
Rawls's first principle, which Armstrong refers to as "fairness," as-
sumes that laws should conform to the idea of equality-that similarly
situated people (and property owners) should be treated similarly under
the law.' The equality principle has links to the Equal Protection Clause
in that it protects horizontal equity by treating like people alike.'
Rawls's notion of equality also provides a basis for Takings Clause
jurisprudence. Rawls's equality principle suggests that a taking occurs if
a regulation singles out certain property owners to bear special burdens
in order to benefit a larger group or, in utilitarian terms, to maximize
that group's happiness.
Rawls and Armstrong explicitly endorse the view that a regulation
should not violate the equality principle inherent in "fairness" by sin-
gling out certain property owners to bear the burden of achieving'a
greater good instead of requiring that the public at large share the bur-
den. Rawls argues that "[t]here is no more justification for using the
state apparatus to compel some citizens to pay for unwanted benefits that
others desire than there is to force them to reimburse others for their
private expenses."26 In Armstrong, the Supreme Court similarly pre-
sumes that the Takings Clause "was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens."27
Rawls's second principle, which is embodied in the idea of "justice,"
stems from his fundamental disagreement with the utilitarian notion that
through certain persons government may achieve a greater societal
23 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 60 ("[E]ach person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.").
2 See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 420 (1977); Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1387-92
(1993).
z See, e.g., Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1434 (9th Cir.
1996) (finding that a taking occurred when a city "forced" a private property owner "to
bear the burden of creating open space for the public to enjoy."); Art Piculell Group v.
Clackamas County, 922 P.2d 1227, 1236 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the Takings
Clause is concerned "with the extent to which particular property may be burdened
because of impacts that are attributable to its development").
26 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 283.
27 United States v. Armstrong, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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good.' Rawls does not believe that decisionmakers should "impose up-
on [some members of society] lower prospects of life for the higher
expectations of others."29 Instead, Rawls's theory of justice holds that
one should not trade or negotiate basic liberties, such as ownership of
private property, for changes in the overall economic distribution.3" In-
deed, Rawls asserts that "injustice" is "simply inequalities that are not to
the benefit of all.'
Rawls would consider an exercise of the police power unjust if it
forced certain property owners to bear the cost of a public good that
others primarily enjoy. Under Armstrong, such an economic redistribu-
tion would be an uncompensated taking. According to the Court, "the
public as a whole" rather than a select class of property owners should
bear the cost of "public burdens., 32 Armstrong essentially holds that the
Takings Clause has a "justice" component that tracks Rawls's theory of
justice. The justice principle in the Takings Clause prevents government
transfers of land use that damage unwilling property owners. In contrast
to tax laws, which can redistribute resources from one class of persons to
another for the public good, if the government uses its regulatory power,
the Takings Clause provides that it must compensate property owners
burdened for "the public as a whole."33
B. Causation
This Article examines the primary exception to both Armstrong's rule
of fairness and justice and Rawls's principles of equality and justice:
Regulated property owners do not merit compensation when their use of
property caused or contributes to a societal problem that a regulation
seeks to redress. Under this exception, the government may single out
the property owner or owners responsible for the problem and may re-
quire that they bear the regulation's cost. This Article argues that a cau-
sation requirement ensures that a regulatory action violates neither the
fairness (equality) nor the justice (redistribution) principle.
If the owners subject to regulation did not cause the problem, howev-
er, then regulating that class of owners likely is an uncompensated tak-
ing. 4 Rawls would concur: Most uncompensated takings are inconsistent
2 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 179-81.
29 Id. at 180.
30 Id. at 61.
31 Id. at 62.
32 Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
33 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 197 (1985).
31 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 283 ("There is no more justification for using the state
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with equality because takings target a class of persons to provide a pub-
lic benefit; takings also are unjust because they force targeted property
owners to bear the cost of a public good that others largely enjoy.35 Ab-
sent causation, a lawmaker should spread the costs of creating and main-
taining community benefits, pursuant to the tax power, or should com-
pensate property owners subject to the public burden.
This Article considers the manner in which the Takings Clause impli-
cates the causation issue, as well as the principles of fairness/equality
and justice espoused by John Rawls and the Court in Armstrong.6 Part
II discusses the Supreme Court's and lower courts' adoption of causation
as a relevant test (and sometimes as the relevant test) in takings cases.37
Part III argues that despite the indeterminacy that arises occasionally
when one seeks to identify who is responsible for a societal evil, it is
possible to ascertain whether a regulated property caused the problem.
Part IV considers the "fairness" rationale for the causation test and sug-
gests that burdening property owners who did not cause the societal
problem violates Rawls's equality principle, which Takings Clause juris-
prudence recognizes.' Part V analyzes the three principal situations in
which traditional land-use regulation does not violate the
Rawls/Armstrong, equality/fairness requirement.39 Finally, Part VI exam-
apparatus to compel some citizens to pay for unwanted benefits that others desire than
there is to force them to reimburse others for their private expenses.").
3 Raymond, supra note 16, at 605.
36 Another threshold Takings Clause causation issue, one that this Article will not
address, asks whether a government actor caused the harm to the owner's property. If
the government did not cause the harm, the Takings Clause does not apply. See, e.g.,
Broad v. Sealaska Corp., 85 F.3d 422, 431 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 768
(1997); Applegate v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 406, 417, appeal dismissed, 77 F.3d
(Fed. Cir. 1996); Powell v. Powell, 877 F. Supp. 628, 631 (M.D. Ga. 1995), vacated,
80 F.3d 464 (11th Cir. 1996); Department of Transp. v. Hewett Prof'l Group, 895 P.2d
755, 763 (Or. 1995); Ventures Northwest Ltd. v. State, 914 P.2d 1180, 1187 (Wash.
App. 1996).
3 The Court applied the causation test in two leading takings cases: Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1994), and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,
483 U.S. 825, 835-36 (1987).
38 Part IV discusses how the Takings Clause reflects the Court's statement in
Armstrong that it is unfair to "single out" private property owners to correct a societal
evil if the presence of the evil is not attributable to the owners' use of their property.
The prohibition against singling-out property owners is consistent with Rawls's equality
principle because the Takings Clause requires courts to use a fair burden sharing stan-
dard to determine whether government actions are takings.
"9 Police power exercises that affect property owners are not takings in the following
circumstances: (1) when there is a causal relationship between the property use regulat-
ed and the societal problem sought to be corrected; (2) when the owners whom the
regulations burden have secured an "average reciprocity of advantage," Pennsylvania
1997)
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ines the "justice" rationale for the Takings Clause's causation require-
ment, which holds that redistributive legislation is usually constitutional
only when the burdened property owner created the need for the wealth
transfer.4"
II. THE USE OF CAUSATION IN TAKINGS CASES
A. Origins
During the one hundred years between Mugler v. Kansas" and Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis 2 one of the most common-
ly used takings tests reasonably assumed that government constitutionally
could deploy its police powers to enjoin property owners from using
their property in ways that were functionally similar to public nuisances.
This "nuisance exception" to the Takings Clause permitted the govern-
ment to use its police power to prevent harms without triggering the
compensation requirement.43 Conversely, the Supreme Court held that a
taking occurred when a law merely extracted public benefits from a
property owner rather than preventing harm." A law that extracted bene-
fits from an individual property owner and conferred them upon the
public fell squarely within the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against
uncompensated takings of private property "for a public use."45
Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); or (3) when it is proper to single out the
property owner because the owner's past behavior belies any reasonable expectation that,
there would be no subsequent liability. Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Construction
Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645-47 (1993); Connolly v. Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 21, 227 (1986); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978); In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 79 F.3d 516, 525-26 (6th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Chater, 117 S. Ct. 682 (1997).
40 See EPSTEIN, supra note 33, at 208 (asserting that the only way to ensure that the
government enacts only efficient measures is to require compensation under the Takings
Clause for all measures with a redistributive impact); cf Frank Michelman, Property as
a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097, 1112-13 (1981) (opining that
effective political participation in a democracy can only be advanced by legislative
redistributions).
41 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
42 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
13 See, e.g., id. at 492 n. 22; Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449
U.S. 155, 163 (1980); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene,
276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler, 123 U.S.
at 668-69.
"4 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
41 See, e.g., Allison Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58
COLUM. L. REV. 650, 666 (1958) ("It is unconstitutional to compel an owner to commit
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Despite the seemingly attractive distinction between laws that consti-
tutionally restrict uses of private property to prevent harms and those
that unconstitutionally burden private property owners in order to provide
public benefits, the harm-benefit dichotomy eventually came under at-
tack. Professor Joseph Sax, for example, noted that the property uses for
which the Supreme Court had invoked the nuisance exception were, in
fact, perfectly lawful and involved no "blameworthiness [or] moral
wrongdoing."' Professor Frank Michelman also demonstrated that it
was difficult to establish a "benchmark of 'neutral' conduct which en-
ables us to say where refusal to confer benefits (not reversible without
compensation) slips into readiness to inflict harms (reversible without
compensation)."47
Eventually, the Supreme Court rejected the distinction between regu-
lation addressing property uses that cause harm and those that extract
public benefits. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,"
the Court turned the distinction on its head by explaining that a valid
exercise of the police power need not prevent a "noxious" property use;
rather, it need only reasonably relate "to the implementation of a poli-
cy ... expected to produce a widespread public benefit."49 After Penn
Central, a regulation that limited private property use in order to advance
a community benefit was not per se invalid; instead, the fact that a regu-
lation furthered a public goal supported its legitimacy."0
Utilitarian reasoning is central to the Penn Central decision.5 In
Penn Central, the Court explicitly rejected the property owner's argu-
ment that a landmark designation program had placed an unfair regulato-
ry burden on a select class of property owners: "We find no merit in...
appellants position ... that the only means of ensuring that selected
owners are not singled out to endure financial hardship ... is to hold
his land to park use in order to meet a public desire for a park .... "); Douglas W.
Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse,
88 COLuM. L. REV. 1630, 1651 (1988) (explaining the "need to draw a distinction be-
tween the use of the police power to prevent harms as opposed to its use to extract
benefits, a distinction central to the nuisance exemption to the just compensation re-
quirement acknowledged by all members of the Court"); Michelman, supra note 15, at
1235-36 (commenting on the intuitive appeal of the distinction between antinuisance
measures and public benefit measures).
46 Sax, supra note 15, at 50.
4 Michelman, supra note 15, at 1197.
48 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
9 Id. at 134 n.30.
5 See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (holding that a land-use regula-
tion does not effect a taking if it "substantially advances legitimate state interests").
51 Raymond, supra note 16, at 616-17.
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that the [law] is a 'taking."' 52 The Court held that the property owners
had no right to compensation because the landmark program's public
benefits far outweighed its costs to individual property owners.53 In con-
trast, Justice Rehnquist's dissent was distinctly Rawlsian. Citing the
Armstrong rationale for the Takings Clause, Justice Rehnquist maintained
that the program under attack in Penn Central was unconstitutional be-
cause it required only a few property owners to suffer the burden of
achieving the public goal of historic preservation.54 Consistent with
Rawlsian theory, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the property owners
should be compensated.55 The law affecting the owners was unfair for
violating the equality principle and unjust for effecting an economic
redistribution from burdened owners to society. 6
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,57 the Court reiterated its
holding in Penn Central that no significant difference existed between a
regulation that prevents harmful nuisance-like uses and one that confers
public benefits.5 Justice Scalia's majority opinion cautioned that any dis-
tinction between a "harm-preventing" and a "benefit-conferring" regu-
lation was primarily "in the eye of the beholder" and "difficult, if not
impossible, to discuss on an objective, value-free basis."59
The Court's reasoning in Lucas appeals to 'both utilitarian and
Rawlsian principles. The Court held that regulations do not effect takings
if they substantially advance legitimate state interests-a utilitarian
view.6" The Court also adopted a rule prohibiting takings claims based
on regulation of nuisance-producing uses of private property that inhere
in the title.6" Utilitarians probably would concur with the Court's ap-
proach because such uses would be antithetical to the maximization of
society's happiness.62 Rawls likely would agree with Lucas's precise
holding, which is that "when the owner of real property has been called
upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial use in the name of the
52 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 131.
53 Id. at 132-35.
51 Id. at 139-40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Armstrong, 364
U.S. 40, 49 (1960)); see supra text accompanying note 19.
55 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 150-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
56 See id. at 139-40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
5' 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
58 Id. at 1022-24.
9 Id. at 1024, 1026; see also Gerald Torres, Taking and Giving: Police Power,
Public Value, and Private Right, 26 ENVTL. L. 1, 23 (1996) ("[T]he harm/benefit dis-
tinction is notoriously unstable .....
60 Id. at 1024.
61 Id. at 1029.
62 Raymond, supra note 16, at 614.
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common good[,] . . .he has suffered a taking. 63
The one-hundred-year run of the harm/benefit distinction ended in
1992 with Lucas. The Court also ended its rote reliance on utilitarian
theory to sustain regulations that burdened some property owners "in the
name of the common good."' Lucas prompted the Court to consider
adopting an alternative test, and another philosophical basis, for deter-
mining when a regulation resulted in an unconstitutional taking. Justice
Scalia has suggested a "causation" test, the elements of which developed
from Rawlsian premises and the Court's rationale in Armstrong.65 In sev-
eral important takings cases, the Supreme Court adopted Scalia's causa-
tion formula.
B. The Supreme Court's Adoption of the Causation Test
In the first Supreme Court case in which the Court applied a causa-
tion test, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,66 the Court found
that an uncompensated taking occurred when a state agency granted a
building permit to property owners subject to the owners' cession of a
lateral easement across their beachfront property. The Court invalidated
the conditional permit because the easement would not eliminate the
problems that the new construction would cause.67 Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, focused on causation in his takings analysis, noting that
it was "impossible to understand how [the permit condition] ... helps to
remedy any additional congestion on [the public beaches] caused by
construction of the Nollans' new house." 6
In Nollan, the Court tied its causation standard to Armstrong's "fair-
ness" justification.69 The fairness requirement presumes that a regulation
may not impose on property owners a responsibility for correcting soci-
etal problems they did not create. That responsibility would be inconsis-
tent with the notions of equality subsumed within Armstrong's fairness
justification.
If the Nollans were being singled out to bear the burden of
63 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
64 Id. at 1026.
65 See supra text accompanying notes 17-31.
6 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
67 Id. at 838-39 ("It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people
already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces any
obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house.") (emphasis added).
61 Id. (emphasis added).
69 Id. at 835-36 n. 4; see supra next accompanying note 19.
19971 369
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
California's attempt to remedy these problems [of congestion
on public beaches], although they had not contributed to it
more than other coastal landowners, the state's action...
might violate either the incorporated Takings Clause or the
Equal Protection Clause ....
The Court's decision in Nollan does not conform to utilitarian principles.
The permit exaction that the state agency demanded is a utilitarian attempt
to redistribute resources from a relatively wealthy landowner to less wealthy
users of public beaches, resulting in a net societal benefit.71 In Nollan, the
Court rejected the utilitarian argument that because society benefits from
expanded public lateral easements across beaches, no compensable taking
occurred. Instead, consistent with Rawlsian theory, Justice Scalia suggested
that the method of delivering that benefit should be a simultaneous easement
against all coastal property owners, rather than singling out those who re-
quested building permits.72
In Dolan v. City of Tigard," the Supreme Court applied Nollan's causa-
tion test to declare unconstitutional a regulation that required a landowner to
dedicate a portion of her property to the city for a storm drainage system
and a pathway prior to receiving a permit to expand her commercial proper-
ty. The Court held that the condition was a taking, in large part because of
the absence of causation: "[The city] has not identified any 'special
quantifiable burdens' created by her [proposed expansion] that would justify
the particular dedications required from her . . . .,,7 The Court concluded
that the pathway was a public good and was largely unrelated to the pro-
posed property expansion.75 Thus, those who wanted the pathway should
fund it.
The Dolan rule requires that the government show that an owner's prop-
erty use would cause a societal evil and that the government's use restriction
would address that evil. Dolan requires that when a government conditions
issuance of a permit, a "rough proportionality" must exist between what the
property owner gives up and "the impact of the proposed development."76
Crucial to Dolan's test is "impact"-the Court must expect find that the
70 Id. (quoting United States v. Armstrong, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)) (emphasis add-
ed); see Note, The Principle of Equality in Takings Clause Jurisprudence, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1030, 1036 (1996); supra text accompanying notes 23-27.
71 Raymond, supra note 16, at 612..
7' Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835-36 n. 4.
71 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
74 Id. at 386 (emphasis added); see also Douglas Kmiec, At Last, The Supreme
Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND
REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAS 112-13 (David L. Callies ed., 1996).
7' Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395-96.
76 Id. at 391.
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planned property use will cause a societal problem that the government
action intends to alleviate. Absent causation, as in Dolan, a regulation vio-
lates Armstrong's notion of fairness and Rawlsian requirements of equality.
Without a causal link, some "people alone" bear public burdens.77 Indeed,
Dolan cites Armstrong for the proposition that without a causative nexus
between impact and condition, the government effectively selected the bur-
dened owner to cede property to the state for public use.78 Such action fa-
cially violates the Takings Clause.
A land-use regulation that does not meet the causation test is "an out-
and-out plan of extortion"'79 that forces certain property owners to bear the
cost of a general community benefit.8" Dolan also marks the Court's adop-
tion of Rawls's theory of justice. Rawls believed that persons should pay
their fair share of additional costs their actions created, but not the full price
of a public good.8 In Dolan, the Court reflected this view by holding that it
would be a taking to exact from a landowner a concession that was dispro-
portionate to the problems the landowner created.
Although the Court has not decided whether causation is a relevant in-
quiry in any takings challenge to a law that burdens or restricts an owner's
property use, Justice Scalia stated the case for a causation test in a pure
regulation-of-property setting in his strongly worded partial dissent in
Pennell v. City of San Jose.82 In Pennell, apartment owners challenged a
rent control ordinance that required hearing officers to determine the rea-
sonableness of proposed rent increases in relation to several factors. One of
these factors was "the economic and financial hardship imposed on the pres-
ent tenant or tenants ... to which such increases apply." 83 Justice Scalia's
partial dissent, which Justice O'Connor joined, confronted the merits of this
takings claim.'
Scalia began by citing Armstrong's justification for the Takings
Clause.85 He then explained why traditional land-use regulation does not
violate this rationale:
I' d. at 384 (citing United States v. Armstrong, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
78 Id. Dolan overruled several lower court cases that upheld dedication requirements
even when the dedications were not intended to address a societal evil attributable to
the property use. See, e.g., Association of Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 484
P.2d 606, 610, 618 (Cal. 1971).
7' Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (citing J.E.D.
Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981)).
o Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
81 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 28, 61-63, 112; Raymond, supra note 16, at 615.
82 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (holding that the takings claim was premature).
83 Id. at 5.
Id. at 15-24 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85 Id. at 19 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Armstrong,
364 U.S. at 49).
1997]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
[T]here is a cause-and-effect relationship between the proper-
ty use restricted by the regulation and the social evil that the
regulation seeks to remedy. Since the owner's use of the
property is (or, but for the regulation, would be) the source
of the social problem, it cannot be said that he has been
singled out unfairly.86
If a cause-and-effect relationship does not exist, however, then the regu-
lation violates the equality/fairness justification undergirding the Takings
Clause.
Scalia argued, consistent with Rawlsian theory and the Armstrong ratio-
nale, that the Takings Clause prevents "the unfairness of making one citizen
pay, in some fashion other than taxes, to remedy a societal problem that is
none of his creation."87 Because the apartment owners were not responsible
for the fact that some renters were too poor to afford reasonably priced
housing, the city's rent control law merely provided an opportunity "to
establish a welfare program privately funded by those landlords who happen
to have 'hardship' tenants."88 A regulation without compensation, however,
cannot be a proper exercise of legislative power because it requires land-
lords to correct a societal problem they did not cause. This disproportionate
burden violates Rawls's equality principle. As Scalia noted, that burden is
inconsistent with "our traditional constitutional notions of fairness."89 Con-
sidering Justice Scalia's partial dissent in Pennell, his opinion in Nollan, and
the majority's reasoning in Dolan, the Supreme Court appears poised to
adopt a causation test as an essential takings inquiry.
C. Lower Courts'Adoption of the Test
Increasingly, federal and state courts embrace the causation test and the
Armstrong rationale in cases in which government action either: (1) imposed
regulatory burdens on the use and development of private property, as in
Pennell, or (2) conditioned receipt of government permission to change or
expand property use on an exaction in the form of dedications, specific
performance, or fees, as in Nollan and Dolan.9"
86 Id. at 20 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
87 Id. at 23 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8I Id. at 21-22 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89 Id. at 22 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see Kmiec, supra
note 45, at 1652-54.
' See generally Edward H. Ziegler, Partial Taking Claims and Horizontal Equity:
Making Sense of Fundamental Fairness and Development Restrictions, 19 ZONING &
PLAN. L. REP. 53 (1996).
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1. Burdens on Property Use
Lower courts have used causation analyses to decide takings claims
when the government has prohibited or restricted private property use. Cau-
sation also has been determinative when the government requires that a
property owner pay for a benefit that either a government entity or a specif-
ic class of persons other than the owner will enjoy primarily. These cases
generally fall into three categories: (1) the government "takes" property by
imposing on an owner a duty to provide a societal benefit to a group of
beneficiaries, (2) land-use restriction that supports or subsidizes a distinct
government function or enterprise, and (3) the government burdens a prop-
erty owner with restrictions designed to secure a benefit for neighboring
landowners.
a. Burdens on Property Owners that Address an Identifiable Group's
Societal Problems
State and local governments may seek to provide a benefit to a particu-
lar group in order to remedy a societal problem associated with the group.
When the government decides that the poor, the homeless, low-income ten-
ants, or the indigent require assistance, and it demands help from property
owners, one must determine whether a causative nexus exists between the
burdened property owner and the societal problem.'Absent a causative link,
the idea of fairness incorporated in Armstrong9' as well as Rawls's equality
principle' indicates that it should be unconstitutional for government to
saddle certain property owners with the burden of correcting the societal
harm. All members of a community must contribute to correcting societal
problems. Remedial costs cannot be shifted to property owners under the
guise of regulation.93
No matter how strong the proffered state interest, if a regulation benefits
a societal class whose needs the affected property owners did not create, the
regulation constitutes a taking.94 Many lower courts have agreed that the
government cannot require that property owners who are not responsible for
the plight of low income people bear the costs of alleviating their economic
91 United States v. Armstrong, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
92 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 60.
9 See San Telmo Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 735 P.2d 673, 675 (Wash. 1987); Theo-
dore C. Taub, Exactions, Linkages, and Regulatory Takings: The Developer's Perspec-
tive, 20 URB. LAW. 515, 524 (1988).
' See Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479, 484-85 (N.Y. 1994)
(holding that a statute requiring that owners provide renewal leases to nonprivate hospi-
tals worked an unconstitutional taking because burdened property owners did not cause
the societal harm the statute addressed), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1961 (1995)).
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problems.95
Courts have relied on two theories when refusing to find a taking with
respect to a law that either limits property use or imposes a duty on proper-
ty owners in order to benefit a particular group. First, courts uphold laws
that require landlords and developers to pay a fee or a portion of low-in-
come housing costs when a reasonable relationship exists between the
owners' actions and the scarcity of low-income residences. 6 Even when the
See, e.g., Golden Gate Hotel Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco, 864 F.
Supp. 917, 927-28 (N.D. Cal.) (holding that requiring hotel owners to provide relocation
assistance for displaced tenants was a taking because it forced the owners to remain in
the residential rental business when they were not solely to blame for the societal ills of
the homeless), modified, 836 F. Supp. 707 (1993), vacated, rev'd, and remanded, 18
F.3d 1482 (9th Cir. 1994); Aspen-Tarp Springs Ltd. Partnership v. Stuart, 635 So. 2d
61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that a requirement that mobile home park owners
buy tenants' homes or pay relocation costs was unconstitutional because the owners did
not cause the tenants' difficulty in finding suitable housing); Property Owners Ass'n v.
Township of North Bergen, 378 A.2d 25 (N.J. 1977) (holding that ordinance requiring
that landlords subsidize senior citizens' rents was a taking because the landlords did not
cause the senior citizens' lack of sufficient economic resources); Seawall Assocs. v.
City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1069 (N.Y.) (finding that regulatory burdens on
the owners of single-room occupancy housing are unconstitutional because the problems
of the homeless were not the owners' fault), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989); 520 E.
81st St. Assocs. v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 555 N.Y.S.2d 697, 703 (App. Div.) (holding that
requiring apartment owners to renew apartment leases for hospital's nurses was a taking
when severe housing shortage was attributable to new demand for residential uses and a
decreased supply of apartments, neither of which the owners caused, and holding that
the burden of creating new residences should have been "borne by society at large"),
appeal withdrawn, 560 N.Y.S.2d 278, rev'd, 570 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1990)).
Further, Washington state has looked to causation as a factor in considering wheth-
er a law imposing a duty on property owners to assist a special group violated due
process. See, e.g., Sintra v. City of Seattle, 829 P.2d 765, 776-77 (Wash. 1992)
("Sintra's property cannot be singled out as contributing to the problem of homelessness
in any pronounced way; the lack of low income housing was brought about by a great
number of economic and social causes which cannot be attributed to an individual par-
cel of property."), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1028 (1992); Presbytery of Seattle v. King
County, 787 P.2d 907, 913 (Wash. 1990) (finding that a land-use regulation may be so
"unduly oppressive" that it violates substantive due process and that one element of an
unduly oppressive law is "the extent to which the owner's land contributes to [a public
problem]"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 911 (1990).
' See Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that a development fee intended to offset housing burdens associated
with influx of low income workers was constitutional because the developers' activities
had caused the increased demand for low income housing), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931
(1992); Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Township of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 286-87 (N.J.
1990) (finding that the imposition of development fees was reasonable because a rela-
tionship existed between the property owners' penchant for unrestrained nonresidential
development and the need for affordable residential development).
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government determines that certain property owners helped create a societal
problem, however, the regulatory and financial burden imposed on those
owners must be proportionate to the negative effect attributed to their prop-
erty use.'
Second, absent causation, some courts justify special demands or limita-
tions on particular property owners if the owners chose to enter a highly
regulated industry and had constructive notice that they could be required to
assist a class of needy persons. For example, because the government has
always "pervasively regulated" nursing homes, the government could require
that a nursing home continue to operate until reasonable alternative arrange-
ments could be made for the patients.98 Similarly, although a court may
concede that "[i]t is not easy to see how ... shifting, to a private
group, . . financial responsibility for the alleviation of a public problem [it]
did not create could square with [the Takings Clause]," '99 courts nonetheless
have justified such burden-shifting when the government did not require that
the regulated group participate in the industry that imposed the burden. For
example, a court found that a limit on a charge to Medicare patients was not
a taking because the doctors, who were not the cause of the Medicare
program's difficulties, chose to practice in Medicare hospitals."°
b. Subsidization of Distinct, Governmental Functions or Enterprises
If the government requests that a real estate or commercial property
developer support or pay for an activity that is normally the government's
Garneau v. City of Seattle, 897 F. Supp. 1318, 1326 (W.D. Wash. 1995); Divan
Builders v. Planning Bd., 334 A.2d 30, 39 (N.J. 1975) (holding that a developer "'could
be compelled only to bear that portion of the cost [of off-site improvements] which
bears a rational nexus to the needs created by ... the subdivision"') (quoting Longridge
Builders v. Planning Bd, 245 A.2d 336, 337 (N.J. 1968)).
98 Birnbaum v. State, 541 N.E.2d 23, 27 (N.Y. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1078
(1990); see also National Wildlife Fed'n v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 850 F.2d
694, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (upholding conversion of abandoned railroad right-of-ways
into nature trails).
99 Garelick v. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. 108, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affid, 987 F.2d 913
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 821 (1993).
" Id. at 113-14 n. 5 (commenting that Justice Scalia's analysis in Pennell "has con-
siderable logical force and may foreshadow a future shift in Supreme Court jurispru-
dence"); see also Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20-24 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Whitney v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 963, 972 (11th Cir.) (holding that temporary
fee freeze on physicians' charges to Medicare patients was not a taking), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 813 (1986). Sometimes a court will concede that a law disproportionately
burdens a particular class of property owners rather than dispersing the cost of confer-
ring a societal benefit upon society as a whole but will sustain the law out of deference
to the legislative decisionmaking process. See Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City & County
of San Francisco, 223 Cal. Rptr. 379, 391 (Ct. App. 1986).
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responsibility,"' a general causation rule operates: The government may
require that the developer mitigate direct impacts of the proposed develop-
ment.12 Alternatively, when the burdens imposed on a developer result
from an accident of land ownership and cost-sharing based on causal re-
sponsibility cannot be calculated, then a financial duty levied on a developer
resembles a public subsidy. Such requirements are usually unconstitutional
takings.0 3
C. Land-Use Restrictions Designed to Secure Direct Benefits to Neighbors
Governments enact some land-use planning regulations that burden par-
ticular property owners in order to benefit those owners' immediate neigh-
bors. These regulations, which often restrict use, are unconstitutional takings
if the owners' proposed use did not cause the problem that the regulation
seeks to correct. For example, Georgia's Supreme Court held that a county
ordinance that restricted placement of manufactured homes to manufactured-
home parks was unconstitutional because the county could not prove that
manufactured homes would devalue neighboring site-built residences."°
101 Among these responsibilities are construction of roads, sewers and sewage treat-
ment plants, parks, and flood control projects.
102 See, e.g., Third & Catalina Assocs. v. City of Phoenix, 895 P.2d 115, 120-21
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that where building owner was responsible for an asbes-
tos problem in his building, he would have to abate the problem in order to comply
with a sprinkler system retrofit ordinance); Circle K Corp. v. City of Mesa, 803 P.2d
457, 464 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that 'an ordinance may require elimination of
nonconforming signs as a condition to permission for the erection of a larger, separate
conforming sign).
103 See, e.g., Christopher Lake Dev. Co. v. St. Louis County, 35 F.3d 1269 (8th Cir.
1994) (concerning drainage); Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v. Madison County Drainage
Bd., 898 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (same); Sneed v. City of Riverside, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 318 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (concerning airports); Hager v. Louisville & Jefferson
County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 261 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953) (concerning
flood control projects); Stevens v. City of Salisbury, 214 A.2d 775 (Md. 1965) (con-
cerning traffic controls); City of Plainfield v. Borough of Middlesex, 173 A.2d 785
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1961) (concerning public parks); Charles v. Diamond, 360
N.E.2d 1295 (N.Y. 1977) (concerning sewers and sewage treatment plants); Westwood
Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of S. Nyack, 244 N.E.2d 700 (N.Y. 1969) (concerning
sewers and sewage treatment plants); Ozolos v. Henley, 438 N.Y.S.2d 349 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1981) (concerning roads); Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505 (N.D.
1983) (concerning schools); Margola Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 854 P.2d 23, 31-32
(Wash. 1993) (concerning inspection costs).
Further, courts occasionally have struck general "development fees" that help to
offset increased costs that would be borne by a locality as a result of the proposed de-
velopment on the grounds that they are taxes, rather than police power regulations, and
therefore are invalid if not legislatively authorized. Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish
County, 650 P.2d 193 (Wash. 1982).
104 Cannon v. Coweta County, 389 S.E.2d 329, 331-32 (Ga. 1990); see also Vernon
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When a particular property use has a causal connection to a specific
societal harm to neighboring property, a law restricting that use still may be
unconstitutional if it does not regulate similarly other property uses that also
contribute to the harm. For example, if both mobile homes and prefabricated
dwellings depress property values, a law that regulates only mobile homes
might be invalid as underinclusive.' 5 These discriminatory laws violate
Rawls's equality principle and Armstrong's "fairness" justification for the
Takings Clause.
Conversely, if no causal link exists between a proposed property use and
a problem that a regulated property owner's neighbors will experience, then
a restriction on a proposed use is not a taking, despite the fact that the
neighbors benefit from the restriction. If, for example, a subdivision
developer's proposed use would hinder access to adjoining property, a rule
requiring that the developer help eliminate such problems would not violate
the Takings Clause, although neighbors benefit at the developer's ex-
pense."° Similarly, if a nonconforming use contributes to urban blight and
imperils a community plan'[smart] s success, imposition of a reasonable
amortization period to eliminate nonconforming uses is not a taking, al-
though neighbors benefit from termination of the use.1 7 Thus, causation
determines the constitutionality of a property regulation.0 8
2. Conditioning Receipt of a Government Permit on Dedications, Public
Improvements, or Fees
In Nollan and Dolan, the Court suggested that government may not
employ its police power to extract public benefits unrelated to an owner's
Park Realty, Inc. v. City of Mount Vernon, 121 N.E.2d 517, 519 (N.Y. 1954) (holding
that land cannot be zoned for a parking lot when similar neighboring property was
zoned for commercial use if the proposed property use would not cause a traffic prob-
lem that a parking lot would improve).
105 Robinson Township v. Knoll, 302 N.W.2d 146, 154-55 (Mich. 1980); see also
Bourgeois v. Parish of St. Tammany, 628 F.Supp. 159, 160-61 (E.D. La. 1986) (holding
that an ordinance excluding mobile homes from certain residential zones but not "tar
shacks" and buildings of inferior construction was an invalid exercise of the police
powers because the ordinance arbitrarily discriminated against one class of dwellings
within a larger class of dwellings that generally harmed neighbors' property values).
"'0 J.C. Reeves Corp. v. Clackamas County, 887 P.2d 360, 365-66 (Or. Ct. App.
1994).
107 Lone v. Montgomery County, 584 A.2d 142, 151-53 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
108 Not all lower courts presume that causation is relevant in Pennell-type land-use
regulation cases. Some courts apply a causation test only when the government imposes
upon property owners an obligation to deed portions of their land or to pay fees prior to
obtaining government permission for a particular use. See, e.g:, Harris v. City of Wich-
ita, 862 F. Supp. 287, 293-94 (D. Kan. 1994), affd, 74 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1996).
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property use as a condition to property development approval." To im-
pose such a condition would violate Armstrong's warning against burdening
property owners in order to address community problems they did not
cause.110
After Nollan and Dolan, government-imposed conditions on receipt of
development approval are constitutional only if they address problems the
property owners generated."' Conditioned permits effect unconstitutional
takings if no causal relationship exists between the property use subject to
the condition and the societal problem the condition seeks to remedy."'
These permits violate Rawls's equality principle because they select a seg-
ment of the population to provide a public good, and they violate Rawls's
justice principle because they redistribute resources by forcing some people
to bear the cost of a public good."3 These conditions also violate the fair-
ness principle embodied in Armstrong. This principle prohibits allocating the
costs of public improvements to developers who have not caused the prob-
lems targeted for correction, and calls for costs to be spread equally among
community members through general revenue-raising devices."4 Lower
courts have adhered to the Nollan-Dolan causation standard in takings cases
involving land dedications, public improvements, and monetary exactions.
109 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
110 See United States v. Armstrong, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); 2 NICHOLS ON EMINENT
DOMAIN § 6.16[3], at 6-109-110 (Julius L. Sackman ed., 3d ed. 1985) ("[W]here, how-
ever, the need for [some public benefit] is not created by, nor uniquely attributable to,
the development, the [condition] amounts to an exercise of the power of eminent do-
main."); 5 EDWARD ZIEGLER, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 65.04, at 65-95 to
65-127 (4th ed. 1996).
... See F&W Assocs. v. County of Somerset, 648 A.2d 482 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1994) (finding that an assessed traffic impact fee was constitutional as a condition
to subdivision and site plan approvals); J.C. Reeves Corp., 887 P.2d at 365 (holding
that a condition on property use that benefits adjoining land is constitutional if the bur-
dened owner's "proposed use of [his] property is what will cause the access problem on
the adjoining property"); Sparks v. Douglas County, 904 P.2d 738, 745-46 (Wash.
1995) (holding that a condition requiring road-widening and additional rights-of-way is
constitutional if development of plats would increase traffic).
112 See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 445-49 & n.8 (Cal.), cert. de-
nied, 117 S. Ct. 299 (1996); Luxembourg Group, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 887 P.2d
446, 448 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
113 See supra text accompanying notes 23-29.
114 See Laurie Reynolds, Living With Land Use Exactions, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 507,
508-09 (1994) (reviewing ALAN ALTSHULER & Jost A. G6MEZ-IBAf4EZ, REGULATIONS
FOR REVENUE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND USE EXACTIONS (1993)).
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a. Land Dedications
In both Nollan and Dolan, the Supreme Court held that a conditionally
granted permit, which required that a property owner dedicate private land,
could be a taking if no causal link existed between the dedication and a
community need. Lower courts also have held that if a property use that
requires a permit did not cause the societal problem that a dedication condi-
tion addresses, or if a condition is proportionally unrelated to the proposed
use's impact, the dedication is an uncompensated taking."5 If, however, a
property use will create a problem for the community's infrastructure, such
as excessive flood drainage, increased sewage, or additional traffic, a gov-
ernment may condition a permit on a dedication tailored to the specific
problem attributable to the property use.116 Lower courts have held that
dedications also may satisfy the causation test if the condition requiring the
dedication improves the property of the owner who makes the dedication
rather than benefiting the general community." 7 These cases do not
1 See, e.g., Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1432 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that a taking occurred when the city imposed a dedication requirement
disproportional to the impact that the property development caused); Surfside Colony,
Ltd. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 277 Cal. Rptr. 371, 376 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that dedication of a public access to a private beach was a taking because there was no
nexus between the dedication and the problem of beach erosion); Rohn v. City of
Visalia, 263 Cal. Rptr. 319, 327-28 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that conditioning issuance
of a building permit on a dedication of land for a road improvement was a taking be-
cause the development did not cause traffic problems); Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Gov't v. Schneider, 849 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that develop-
ment approval conditioned on dedication of land and a bridge was a taking because the
proposed development would account for only two percent of bridge use); St. Onge v.
Donovan, 522 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that conditioning a variance on phas-
ing out of another parcel of property was impermissible because the requirement was
unrelated to the proposed land use or its impact on neighboring property); Art Piculell
Group v. Clackamas County, 922 P.2d 1227, 1236 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) ("[T]he determi-
native factor [for a takings claim] must be the relationship between the impacts [caused
by] the development [rather than] the extent of the public's need for ... improve-
ments."); Schultz v. City of Grants Pass, 884 P.2d 569, 573 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (hold-
ing that a residential development resulting in a traffic increase of eight road trips per
day did not justify a 20,000 square foot dedication); Luxembourg Group, 887 P.2d at
448 (holding that a taking occurred when a county conditioned a landowner's rezoning
permit on a dedication intended to provide access across adjoining landlocked property
because the need for access was caused not by the development but by the isolated
property owner's original location).
116 See, e.g., Francis 0. Day Co. v. Montgomery County, 650 A.2d 303, 308 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1994); Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 537 N.W.2d 301, 308 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1995); J.C. Reeves Corp., 887 P.2d at 365.
117 See, e.g., Sarasota County v. Taylor Woodrow Homes Ltd., 652 So. 2d 1247,
1252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Nelson v. City of Lake Oswego, 869 P.2d 350, 354
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conflict with Armstrong because of a "singling-out" to bear a public burden.
b. Public Improvements
The government may condition a land-use permit on a requirement that
the landowner construct facilities that will be open to or public use. The
government also may require a permit seeker to upgrade or repair roads and
streets on and off the property to be developed. For purposes of takings
causation analyses, the initial question is whether there is a difference be-
tween a requirement that a developer convey title to part of the property for
a public purpose and a requirement that a developer improve the property
and make it available for a public purpose.
Whether the government requires an owner to convey title (a dedication)
or allows the owner to retain title (a public improvement), the government
imposes equal burdens on the owner by requiring that the public benefit
from the owner's property. Both situations compromise an' owner's near-
sacrosanct "right to exclude." ' Further, in both situations, it is unfair for
the government to condition an owner's proposed use on performance of
some action that may be unrelated to the nature and effect of that use. The
Nollan-Dolan causation test should apply to conditions that demand that
private property owners construct or enhance a public improvement.19
Dolan requires that a government-imposed condition reflect a "rough
proportionality" between the property use and its external effects. 20 The
rough-proportionality standard ensures that public improvements required of
a property owner will respond only to the property use's impacts. 21 If a
public improvement that is a condition to land development approval is
completely unrelated to the development proposal, causation is absent, and
the condition is a taking.
(Or. Ct. App. 1994).
... Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994); Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
119 See, e.g., Clark v. City of Albany, 904 P.2d 185, 189 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (con-
cerning street improvements).
120 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
12 See Clark, 904 P.2d at 189; J.C. Reeves Corp. v. Clackamas County, 887 P.2d
360, 365 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
122 See, e.g., Cupp v. Board of Supervisors, 318 S.E.2d 407 (Va. 1984) (concerning
road construction); Plote, Inc. v. Minnesota Alden Co., 422 N.E.2d 231 (II1. App. Ct.
1981) (construction of village cultural center); Triesman v. Town of Bedford, 563 A.2d
786 (N.H. 1989) (holding that privately owned helicopters must be made available to
town's police department).
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c. Monetary Exactions
Fee payments do not affect an attribute of real property. Fees simply
burden property owners. Originally, local governments relied on "in-lieu-of-
fees,"'' which financed off-site facilities, such as schools and open space,
when a land dedication would have sufficed."2 "Impact fees" are similar
to in-lieu-of-fees in that they are charges that local governments levy against
private property owners as conditions to approval of land development.
Unlike in-lieu-of fees, the government can levy impact fees even when a
dedication of land would not be appropriate."
Impact fees can take one of three forms. One is "linkage fees," which
require that property developers contribute funds toward assisting identifi-
able groups that the new development adversely affects. This kind of regula-
tion 26 may lessen some of the societal costs and dislocations associated
with new land uses. A government usually assesses linkage fees to pay for
housing for those who will work on a new facility, or for those residents
whom a new facility will displace. 27
A second type of impact fee is that which the government assesses
against new subdivisions, apartments, and commercial developments in
order to pay for public facilities that a property use made necessary. These
public facilities may include roads, sewers, recreation centers, water sys-
tems, schools, parks, drainage systems, waste disposal sites, and police and
fire stations. The majority of jurisdictions apply a three-part test to deter-
mine the constitutionality of this type of impact fee: (1) the property use
must credite the need for the facilities;2 8 (2) the fee must not merely raise
12 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 25.40, at 398-403 (3d ed.
1986 & Supp. 1994).
124 See, e.g., Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685 (Ct. App.
1981) (requiring fees or dedication of land to relieve school overcrowding problem
created by development); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 218 N.E. 2d 673 (N.Y.
1966) (requiring fees in lieu of land allotment for park purposes).
125 Otto Hetzel & Kimberly Gough, Assessing the Impact of Dolan v. City of Tigard
on Local Governments' Land Use Powers, in TAKINGS, supra note 74, at 238.
12 See supra text accompanying notes 76-82.
127 Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931 (1992).
128 Compare Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Scottsdale, 902 P.2d 1347, 1350 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1995) (finding that an impact fee was constitutional because it directly related
to a need for more water, which was attributable to the property development), and
Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 877 P.2d 187, 194 (Wash. 1994) (finding that impact
fees imposed were "reasonably necessary as a direct result of [the] proposed develop-
ment"), with New Jersey Builders Ass'n v. Mayor of Bernards Township, 528 A.2d
555, 562 (N.J. 1987) (finding that an ordinance requiring that developers help pay for
road improvements was unconstitutional because the road improvements were not limit-
ed to the needs directly generated by the new development).
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general revenue but must enter a segregated fund earmarked for expendi-
tures to address problems caused the property owner who paid the fee
caused;29 and (3) the property owner paying the fee must be likely to ben-
efit from its expenditure.
130
The third type of impact fee-a "special assessment"-is an exercise of
the government's taxing power, rather than its police power. The principle
underlying special assessments is that to meet the cost of public improve-
ments, government may tax property owners who particularly benefit from
the improvements. Under this theory, the "taxed" owners pay only for the
benefit they receive from the improvement.. Consistent with the causation
test, however, the Supreme Court has held that "the exaction from the owner
of private property of the cost of a public improvement in substantial excess
of the special benefits accruing to him is, to the extent of such excess, a
taking, under the guise of taxation.'' 3. Also, consistent with Rawls's
equality principle and Armstrong's notion of "fairness," the government
calculates special assessments to equalize the cost of an improvement among
the benefiting property owners. Property owners should bear only their fair
share of the cost.
13 2
Although some authority suggests that the Nollan-Dolan causation stan-
dard should apply only to conditions that constitute physical encroach-
ment,133 many courts have concluded that an impact fee may be a taking if
exacted to pay for improvements that are not reasonably necessary as direct
results of a proposed development."M In the influential Ehrlich v. City of
Culver City 35 decision, the Supreme Court of California held that Dolan's
rough-proportionality test and Nollan's causation standard may work to void
impact fees if a tenuous link exists between the fee and the proposed devel-
opment. 36 The court grounded its holding in Armstrong's admonition
129 See, e.g., Andres v. Village of Flossmoor, 304 N.E.2d 700 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973)
(holding that a $1,000 per building assessment that went to a general fund was uncon-
stitutional).
130 See, e.g., Northern Ill. Home Builders Ass'n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d
384, 390 (I11. 995).
'' Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 278-79 (1898).
132 See, e.g., White v. County of San Diego, 608 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980); Bauer v. City
of Olathe, 894 P.2d 823, 833-34 (Kan. 1995).
133 See, e.g., Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566 (10th Cir. 1995); Commer-
cial Builders, 941 F.2d at 876; Parking Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga.
1994); Sprenger, Grubb & Assocs. v. City of Hailey, 903 P.2d 741 (Idaho 1995); Mc-
Carthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836 (Kan. 1995).
,34 See, e.g., Christopher Lake Dev. Co. v. St. Louis County, 35 F.3d 1269 (8th Cir.
1994); Northern Ill. Home Builders, 649 N.E.2d 384; Clark v. City of Albany, 904 P.2d
185 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y.
1994); Castle Homes & Dev., Inc. v. Brier City, 882 P.2d 1172 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
131 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996).
136 Id. at 445-49; see id. at 445 n.8 (discussing Justice Scalia's partial dissent in
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against "forcing some people alone to bear public burdens."'' 37
III. Is THE CAUSATION TEST Too INDETERMINATE?
A. Who Caused the Societal Evil?
Before considering the fairness (equality) and justice (anti-redistribution)
rationales underlying the causation test, one should attempt to identify the
cause of the societal evil that a law seeks to redress. The causation test
advanced in Nollan, Dolan, Scalia's Pennell partial dissent, and the other
cases discussed above, 3' makes three assumptions: (1) although a law may
favor certain public benefits to the detriment of relatively small groups of
individuals, the fairness principle suffers only if those singled out to bear
the cost of a regulation did not cause the problem the regulation intends to
correct; 139 (2) a court can identify the cause of the societal harm a regula-
tion seeks to ameliorate; and (3) if a court cannot trace the cause of a soci-
etal problem to the property owner a regulation affects, under Armstrong,
the regulation likely works a taking. If the second assumption is incorrect, a
causation test is of dubious merit.
Professor Ronald Coase recognized the problem of locating a societal
problem's single causative agent in controversies involving multiple parties.
Professor Coase showed that it may be impossible to know whether a regu-
lated property owner or those a regulation protects caused the harm the
regulation addresses. 4 Other commentators, such as Professors Joseph
Sax, '4 Frank Michelman,"' and Laurence Tribe,'43 similarly have ac-
knowledged an inherent difficulty in deciding who has harmed whom.
The Supreme Court's reflects the shifting analytical approaches to iden-
tifying causal responsibility. In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.
Pennel v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 15-24 (1988)).
137 Id. at 447 (quoting United States v. Armstrong, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
136 See supra Part II.C.
139 At least one legal commentator mistakenly concluded, however, that "the fear of
government unjustly singling out a few individuals for adverse treatment has no place
in ... compensation analysis." Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1138
(1993). Professor Rubenfeld fails to note that the problem with "singling out" individu-
als for regulatory burdens arises not from the fact that a law burdens a small class of
individuals but that it forces these individuals to bear the burden of correcting a prob-
lem they did not cause.
14 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
141 Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property, and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149,
167 (1971).
142 Michelman, supra note 15, at 1243-44.
143 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 594 (2d. ed. 1988).
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Public Utilities Commission,144 the Court held that it was not a taking for
a state to require a railroad to bear the costs of constructing grade separa-
tions between railroad tracks and adjacent streets because "[t]he presence of
these tracks in the streets creates the burden of constructing grade separa-
tions in the interest of public safety."'4 Eighteen years earlier, however, in
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway v. Walters,'46 the Court con-
cluded that increased motor traffic, rather than the railroad's operations,
caused a safety problem.'47 In Nashville, the Court fully embraced the
Rawlsian-Armstrong rationale for the Takings Clause and stated that the
government could not single out the railroad to bear the cost of advancing
the public interest unless the costs imposed on the railroad related to the
benefits it derived from the improvements. 4
Three other Supreme Court takings cases demonstrate the problem of
finding a single cause of certain societal problems. In Miller v. Schoene,'49
the Court sustained a regnlation that required that the plaintiff destroy his
cedar trees because they produced a cedar rust that killed nearby apple trees.
Although the Court justified its holding on the basis that the cedar trees
caused the harm to the apple trees, one could argue persuasively that be-
cause of their proximity and susceptibility to cedar rust, the apple trees'
owner created an environment in which the rust could damage his trees. 50
In Hadacheck v. Sebastian,' the Court upheld an ordinance that required
that a brickyard built far beyond the city cease its operations when the city's
population grew too close to it. Although the Court held that the ordinance
was not a taking because the brickyard's pollution harmed the encroaching
city residents, the Court could have reasoned that the residents caused their
harm by voluntarily approaching a known nuisance.'
"4 346 U.S. 346 (1953).
145 Id. at 353.
146 294 U.S. 405 (1935).
147 Id. at 422-23; see infra text accompanying notes 162-65 (asserting that Atchison
and Nashville are reconcilable).
148 Id. at 428-29. For a discussion of how these grade separation cases reflect the
relativism of causation in a takings context, see Michael J. Davis & Robert L.
Glicksman, To the Promised Land: A Century of Wandering and a Final Homeland for
Due Process and Taking Clauses, 68 OR. L. REV. 393, 422 (1989); Arvo Van Alstyne,
Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria,
44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 50 (1971).
149 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928).
'SO See Michelman, supra note 15, at 1198-99.
15 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915).
152 See Sax, supra note 15, at 50; see also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590 (1962) (holding that no taking occurred when town prohibited sand and gravel
operation from excavating below water level, even though the owner's operation did not
produce any problems until the town's population expanded to. within 3500 feet of the
pit).
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Even the Court's opinion in Nollan is susceptible to challenge based on
indeterminacy of causation. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia concluded
that the problem the Coastal Commission sought to correct was inadequate
lateral access across beaches and therefore held that the Coastal Commission
could not require that the Nollans dedicate a lateral easement parallel to the
beach. Two factors buttressed the Court's holding. First, the Nollans' pro-
posed use of their beach-front property did not cause inadequate lateral
access across the beach.'53 Second, because of this lack of causation, the
dedication would amount to an interference with the Nollans' right to ex-
clude others from their land.'54 Ultimately, however, it was the Nollans'
exercise of their right to exclude that prevented the Commission from im-
posing the dedication requirement. Thus, one could argue that it was the
Nollans who caused the lateral access problem by asserting their right to ex-
clude.'55
B. Clarifying Causal Indeterminacy
Despite evidence that indeterminacy dooms the causation test, applica-
tion of Rawls's and Armstrong's notions of "justice," coupled with a closer
reading of the cases typically cited to establish the indecisiveness of a cau-
sation test, 56 suggests that a causation analysis remains viable. Part VI of
this Article points out that Rawls's and Armstrong's concepts of justice
assume that it is unjust for a law to effect a property transfer from one own-
er to another. This concept of justice requires that the response to occasional
causal indeterminacy cannot be to abandon the causation test in favor of
deference to legislatures. If that occurs, legislatures would determine pre-
ferred property uses as a policy matter.
Some legal commentators advance legislative control as the solution to
the problem of causal indeterminacy.'57 The Supreme Court often adopts
'" Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 838 (1987) ("It is quite
impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on public beaches be
able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach
created by the new house.") (emphasis added). In Nollan, Justice Scalia argued that the
Commission could have required that the Nollans dedicate a viewing spot on their land
because the proposed changes to their house would cause inadequate visual access. Id.
at 836.
1- Id. at 831.
15 See Note, Taking a Step Back: A Reconsideration of the Takings Test of Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 102 HARv. L. REV. 448, 456-57 (1988).
116 See cases discussed supra Part III.A.
7 See Note, supra note 155, at 456 ("The legislature enacts a rule change when it
perceives that the existing balance of entitlements is no longer proper in light of chang-
es in conditions or in the legislative judgment of the public welfare. The 'social evil'
addressed by the change is thus [not caused by one action but is] actually the existing
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this choice when considering a conflict between two uses. In Miller, for
example, the Court addressed a conflict involving cedar trees that harbored a
rust fungus dangerous to apple trees. 58 The state ordered the cedar trees
cut down without compensating the tress' owner, but the Court did not
review the owner's takings claim by considering whether the cedar trees had
caused a nuisance vis-t-vis the apple trees. Instead, the Court's decision
turned on the strictly utilitarian question of whether the benefits to the apple
growers outweighed the cedar trees' value.'59 The Court deferred to the
legislature for resolution of this issue and permitted it to decide "upon the
destruction of one class of property in order to save another which, in the
judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the public.' ' 60
The Court's failure in Miller to address the causation question violates
the Rawls-Armstrong justice principle because it authorized a legislative
redistribution of private property from the cedar tree owner to the apple tree
grower without compensating the cedar tree owner. Not only is the Miller
result contrary to the purposes of the Takings Clause, it is also wholly in-
consistent with any theory of constitutional protection of private property.
The Constitution should not provide greater protection for one type of pri-
vate property than for another merely because a legislature decides that one
type is more worthy than another.
In Miller, the inquiry should have been whether the cedar tree owners'
possession or use of their private property caused the damage to the apple
trees. If so, a law requiring eradication of the cedar trees would not be a
taking. If not, the law at issue in Miller likely would be a taking because the
Takings Clause's anti-redistributive justice component prevents a legislature
from destroying one class of property to benefit another.
One must ask, however, what courts should do in takings cases if justice
counsels against resolving close causal questions by deferring to legislative
decisions. An initial response is that courts should not abandon a general
causation test merely because one can conjure up factual examples that
question the test's usefulness. In the vast majority of takings cases, deter-
mining whether a causal link exists between a property owner burdened with
a regulation and a problem that a regulation seeks to redress should not be
difficult. In Pennell, for example, the apartment owners subject to the rent
control were not responsible for the fact that certain tenants were too poor
to pay higher rents. Therefore, as Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in
Pennell, the rule exhibits unconstitutional "unfairness" by "making one citi-
zen pay, in some fashion other than taxes, to remedy a social problem that
balance of entitlements.").
118 Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); see supra text accompanying notes 149-
50.
19 Miller, 276 U.S. at 278-79.
160 Id. at 279.
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is none of his creation. 16'
Atchison and Nashville, which arguably produced divergent results under
the causation test, are, in fact, reconcilable. 162 In Nashville, the government
required that railroads pay for a grade separation between the railroad track
and the state highway in order to satisfy a statutory condition to receipt of
federal aid for the state highway system rather than meet local needs for
safe transportation. 16' The requirement was a taking because only the rail-
roads bore the cost of advancing the state's interest in obtaining the federal
funds."M In contrast, in Atchison it was the presence of railroad tracks in
local streets that "creat[ed] the burden of constructing grade separations in
the interest of public safety."'65 Because the railroads caused the problem
in Atchison, the government could require that they help pay the remedial
costs.
The solution to the causal confusion arguably present in Miller,
Hadacheck, and Nollan'6 can be found in Justice Scalia's analysis of the
Takings Clause in Lucas. 67 In Lucas, Scalia, writing for the Court, stated
that in determining whether a property-use restriction is a taking, a critical
inquiry is whether the regulation "proscribe[s] a productive use that was
previously permissible under relevant property and nuisance principles."'1
68
If a proscribed use was not originally part of a title, no matter how burden-
some the regulation, it can resist a takings challenge. If, however, a limita-
tion does not "inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background
principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon
land ownership,', 69 then without an adequate causal link, the restriction is
likely a taking.
Lucas suggests that the initial inquiry should be whether a use of prop-
erty that is subject to regulation creates a societal problem that state law
either forbids or characterizes as a nuisance. If it does either, then state law
161 Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 23 (1988).
162 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346
(1953); Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935); see
supra text accompanying notes 144-48 (discussing the cases' seemingly divergent re-
sults).
1 Nashville, 294 U.S. at 429-31.
'6 Id. at 429.
' Atchison, 346 U.S. at 353.
16 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); see also
supra text accompanying notes 149-55.
16 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); supra text
accompanying notes 57-65 (analyzing Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas).
" Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029-30.
169 Id. at 1029. The only Supreme Court decisiofis emphasizing causation as an ele-
ment in takings analysis are those authored by Justice Scalia.
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has determined that a causal link exists between the property use and the
societal harm, and the Takings Clause is not triggered. Upon application of
Lucas's reliance on state law to Miller, Hadacheck, and Nollan, any remain-
ing causal indeterminacy largely disappears.
If the Court had decided Miller after Lucas, the question for it would
have been whether the cedar trees' owner created a nuisance with respect to
the apple trees. If under applicable state nuisance law the cedar trees were a
nuisance to the apple trees, then the regulatory burden on the cedar trees'
owner was not a taking.17 Whether the cedar trees were a nuisance is a
close question, in large part because the spores moved from cedar to apple
trees by their own motion or by the forces of nature, but not by any act of
the cedar tree owner. Although the answer to this question is not obvious,
the takings question, properly posed, involves causation and should not
hinge on a legislative preference for certain classes of property.
Courts address causation in virtually every common law nuisance ac-
tion.171 Further, nuisance law survives despite the occasional cases in
which it is difficult to pinpoint proximate cause. Causation is also a critical
element of standing under Article 111.172 Although it is not always easy to
trace an injury to conduct, the Court still analyzes causation when examin-
ing whether a plaintiff has standing.' Similarly, the fact that a difficult
case like Miller might arise should not negate causation as the appropriate
takings test when policymakers subject property owners to a regulation after
wrongly assuming that the owners were responsible for a societal evil.
Hadacheck is analytically similar to a "coming to the nuisance"
case. 74 The Court's refusal to find a taking in Hadacheck seems justified
after Lucas because as a matter of state nuisance law, the brickyard was a
nuisance to the residential housing that was built in the brickyard's vicinity.
Although the residents came to the nuisance, that fact operated, at most, as a
partial offset to the brickyard's losses.75 Indeed, several commentators
have concluded that the facts in cases similar to Hadacheck "support the
requirement that [a] prohibition or regulation must compel an owner to elim-
inate a public evil created by him.'' 7 6
170 See EPSTEIN, supra note 33, at 114.
171 See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS at ch. 7 (Proximate Cause) (5th ed. 1984); FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE
LAW OF TORTS at ch. XX (Legal Cause) (2d. ed. 1986); Daniel W. Kilduff, Tort, Tak-
ing, or Both?, 42 FED. LAW 25 (May 1995).
172 See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1972).
173 See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group,
Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1529, 1533-34 (1996).
174 EPSTEIN, supra note 33, at 119-21; see supra text accompanying notes 151-52.
"I EPSTEIN, supra note 33, at 120.
176 See, e.g., Allison Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty
Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 63, 75.
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Finally, only in abstract legal commentary can one say seriously that the
causation question regarding the lateral beach access problem in Nollan'7
was indeterminate and resulted from the willingness of the burdened proper-
ty owners to exercise their power to exclude. Exercise of a constitutional
and common law property right can never in any.real sense "cause" a soci-
etal evil. Nollan's causation analysis is correct. The problem of inadequate
lateral beach access likely had many contributing causes, including too few
public easements and too many Californians who wished to traverse the
shorefront. The Nollans' proposed new house, which may have obstructed
the ocean view for drivers, could not possibly have caused a lateral access
problem for people who walked along the public beach behind their house.
Without a causal link to the Nollans, the dedication condition was "an out-
and-out plan of extortion,'' 7  a violation of Rawls's equality principle and
Armstrong's fairness principle, and a taking.
IV. THE FAIRNESS RATIONALE AND EQUALITY PRINCIPLE
To the extent that the Supreme Court chooses to articulate the purpose
of the Takings Clause, it usually quotes Armstrong's statement that the
Clause "was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens.' ' 179 This simple statement contains an important rule:
It is unfair, and therefore impermissible, for a government to single out a
particular property owner, or limited class of property owners, to pay for
improving the general public condition when they did not create the need
for the improvement. Similarly, John Rawls's equality principle rejects a
legal system that regards persons who did not cause a societal evil as a
means of correcting the evil for society's greater good. 8'
When the Court does not cite Armstrong's Takings Clause explanation,
it typically uses language that concurs with the rule in that case. In both
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis"' and Agins v.
Tiburon,"2 the Court explained that the "determination that governmental
action constitutes a taking is, in essence, a determination that the public at
large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of
state power in the public interest."'8 3 Long before Armstrong, in Pennsyl-
17 See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
178 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (quoting J.E.D.
Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981)).
179 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374, [2316] [need US cite] (1994); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 608
(1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1976).
o RAWLS, supra note 4, at 179-80.
181 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
182 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
183 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 492 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).
19971 389
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
vania Coal v. Mahon," Justice Holmes confirmed that Armstrong's expla-
nation for the Takings Clause was correct when he noted that in regulatory
takings cases "the question at bottom is upon whom the loss of the [regula-
tory] changes desired should fall."' 85
The manner in which lower courts altered their constitutional analysis of
takings claims after Armstrong evidences the influence of its rule. This shift
is particularly noticeable in cases in which a government imposed burdens
on property owners in the form of conditions and exactions necessary to
obtain permission to develop the property. Prior to Armstrong, a common
view was that publicly imposed conditions were the price a developer had to
pay to have a plat approved and recorded and to receive the benefits and
services of being within a local government's jurisdiction.8 6 After
Armstrong, lower courts increasingly used Armstrong's causation test when
reviewing ordinances and regulations that required a property developer to
dedicate land for community needs, such as open space, parks, schools, and
sewers, or to pay fees in lieu thereof.'87 The pertinent question is whether
the costs of public services and facilities are attributable to changes and
growth pressures resulting from new property development.' 8 If so, the
law properly burdens property owners, it meets Armstrong's fairness re-
quirements, satisfies Rawls's equality principle, and does not effect a taking.
A. Fairness and Causation
The Supreme Court repeatedly voiced the "fairness" basis for the Tak-
ings Clause long before it decided Armstrong.'89 What, in a takings con-
text, does "fairness" mean? Conversely, what makes a regulation so unfair
that it works a taking?
Pre-Armstrong Supreme Court takings cases suggest that the Takings
Clause promoted fairness by requiring that property owners receive compen-
sation for loss of economic value of their property due to government action
designed to promote the public welfare, especially where the burdened
'- 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
'85 Id. at 416.
186 See, e.g., Mefford v. City of Tulare, 228 P.2d 847 (Cal. 1951); Petterson v. City
of Naperville, 137 N.E.2d 371 (I11. 956).
187 See cases discussed supra Part II.C.
188 See, e.g., Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d
799 (Ill. 1961); Divan Builders v. Planning Bd., 334 A.2d 30 (N.J. 1975); Jordan v.
Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965); see also Robert R. Wright,
Exclusionary Land Use Controls and the Taking Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 545,
572-73 (1981).
'89 See, e.g., United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 (1950);
United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949); United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S.
745, 748 (1947).
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property's link to that public welfare was tenuous. In United States v. Wil-
low River Power Co.,' for example, the Court explained that "[tihe Fifth
Amendment ... undertakes to redistribute certain economic losses inflicted
by public improvements so that they will fall upon the public rather than
wholly upon those who happen to lie in the path of the project. '" 191 The
Court's apparent willingness to utilize the Takings Clause to protect proper-
ty owners "who happen to lie in the path" of some government enterprise
implies a special sensitivity to property owners whose use did not prompt
the government action but were merely convenient targets of opportunity.
Justice Scalia's dissent in Pennell, in which he commented that "the unfair-
ness of making one citizen pay, in some fashion other than taxes, to remedy
a social problem that is none of his creation," reflects this early view.'92
Legal commentators generally have agreed that to the extent that fairness
drives takings jurisprudence, a regulation is more likely to be unfair, and
therefore effect a taking, when two conditions are present: (1) the regulation
is designed to confer benefits that will advantage the public good, or a
group of individuals but not necessarily an affected property owner's inter-
ests,"' and (2) a regulated property owner is not responsible for the soci-
etal problem whose correction will result in the public benefit. For example,
two years after Armstrong, Professor Allison Dunham observed that the
Takings Clause "involves largely an ethical judgment ... that compensation
must be paid for loss suffered to create a public benefit, but need not be
paid for loss suffered when government removes a public harm 'created' by
an owner or his property."'94 Professor Arvo Van Alstyne wrote in 1971
that "[w]here the advantage obtained from a mandatory expenditure [forced
on a property owner] is enjoyed primarily, if not exclusively, by persons
other than the one required to make it,... the basic unfairness of [an] im-
position seems obvious.'
95
The question remaining, however, is why is it necessary to have a link
between a regulated private property use and a societal problem whose re-
moval will result in a public benefit? Alternatively, why is it unfair and
therefore an unconstitutional, uncompensated taking to impose on a property
owner, or a single class of owners, the costs of solving a societal problem
not caused by the owner(s)? The answer lies in Rawls's equality principle,
190 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
191 Id. at 502; see Delaware, Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co. v. Town of Morristown,
276 U.S. 182 (1928); Great N. Ry. Co. v. Cahill, 253 U.S. 71 (1920).
192 Pennell v. Tri-County Apartment House Owners Ass'n, 485 U.S. 1, 23 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
193 When a property owner also benefits from a regulation imposed on her, the owner
and the public have "secured an average reciprocity of advantage" that will tend to
justify the regulation. See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
'9 Dunham, supra note 176, at 80-81.
195 Van Alstyne, supra note 148, at 50-51.
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which intertwines with the Takings Clause.
B. Equality and Causation
Unlike "justice," which concerns efficiency and the distributive conse-
quences of public policies, "fairness" reflects on any disparity between how
the law treats a regulated property owner relative to other, similarly situated
but nonregulated property owners and the public. John Rawls's concept of
equality is grounded, in part, on this notion of fairness. Rawls argues that
equality is a societal goal composed of three elements: (1) egalitarian-
ism-"each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic
liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others";19 (2) the "difference
principle"-"social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they
are ... reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage;' '197 and (3)
maximization of a person's "share"--changes from an equal distribution are
permissible so long as these changes seek to maximize the share of minority
groups.198 Rawls's three conditions roughly correspond to the three compo-
nents of "fairness" within the Takings Clause: (1) horizontal equity, (2) the
singling-out prohibition, and (3) the just-share principle.
1. Horizontal Equity, the Equal Protection Clause, and Takings
Fairness and equality respect "horizontal equity," which assumes that it
is unfair, and therefore improper, for a law to fail to treat similar people
alike.' 99 Horizontal equity is one basis for the Equal Protection Clause,
which requires that no state "deny to any person ... the equal protection of
its laws."'' "° It also helps define the purpose of the Takings Clause, which,
as Armstrong explains, is to "bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens."' Because horizontal equity principles un-
derlie both the Equal Protection Clause and the Takings Clause, it is not
surprising that they do not overlap. Indeed, Nollan expressly acknowledges
the related nature of the two clauses by pointing out that if the Nollans were
required to correct a portion of the lateral beach access problem that they
did not cause, "the State's action, even if otherwise valid, might violate
196 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 60.
19 Id.
198 Id. at 61; see also Raymond, supra note 16, at 586, 605.
199 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and
Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 420 (1977); A. Don Tarlock, Regulatory Takings, 60
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 23, 31 (1984); Ziegler, supra note 90, at 53-54.
20 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
" Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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either the incorporated Takings Clause or the Equal Protection Clause."'2 2
Some lower courts have assumed, consistent with Nollan, that a law that
singles out certain property owners to bear the burden of correcting a soci-
etal problem can be unconstitutional under both the Takings and Equal Pro-
tection Clauses. 3
The Court employs quite different levels of scrutiny, however, when it
reviews challenges to socioeconomic regulation based on these clauses.
Under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court requires only that a law ratio-
nally relates to some legitimate state interest.' By contrast, takings claims
are subject to more exacting scrutiny under intermediate judicial review.2'5
The difference between the levels of scrutiny are difficult to explain
because the inquiry is often the same when property owners bring challeng-
es under either clause: Has the law imposed a regulatory burden on one
class of property owners (or one property owner) that restricted property use
and that caused a landowner's property to suffer an economic diminution in
value? One possible explanation for the distinction between the two clauses
may lie in their slightly different purposes. The Equal Protection Clause
seems to protect individual property owners in an economic market from
special burdens not imposed upon similarly situated owners operating in the
same market. Often, a regulation puts one market actor at a competitive
disadvantage with respect to seemingly similar market actors. For example,
in FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.,2°6 a broadcasting facility brought
an equal protection challenge against a federal statute that permitted a feder-
al agency to franchise some facilities but not others. In City of New Orleans
v. Dukes,2 ' 7 the ordinance under attack prohibited pushcart vendor sales in
the city's French Quarter, except for sales by vendors who had operated in
that area for at least eight years.
In the equal protection context, the Court asks two questions: (1) Does
the classification affect a suspect class, a quasi-suspect class, or an exercise
of a fundamental right?; and (2) If not, is the classification "rationally"
related to a proper state goal?20' If the answer to the latter query is yes,
neither the Equal Protection Clause nor the principle of horizontal equity is
202 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 (1987).
See, e.g., Christopher Lake Dev. Co. v. St. Louis County, 35 F.3d 1269, 1274-75
(8th Cir. 1994).
' See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc. 508 U.S. 307, 313-15 (1993)
(applying rational basis test to equal protection analysis).
'o Compare id. with Dolan v. Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389-90 (1994); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022-31 (1994); No~lan, 485 U.S. at 834-35
n.3 ("Our opinions do not establish that these standards [of review for takings claims]
are the same as those applied to ... equal protection claims.").
206 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
427 U.S. 297 (1976).
28 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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violated.2" This result seems correct because the Equal Protection Clause
should not prevent inequalities caused by government regulation between
market actors within a relevant market system when an arguable distinction
explains why the regulation treats some actors differently than others. In
Beach Communications and Dukes, the Supreme Court sustained the classifi-
cations under attack because it found a rational distinction among broadcast-
ing facilities in Beach"' and among pushcart vendors in Dukes.211 So
long as the government advances a valid state interest, a classification that
favors one market participant over another, similarly situated participant,
should withstand an equal protection challenge.2"2
In contrast, the Takings Clause does not prevent the government from
singling out individual property owners from similarly situated owners, but
it does protect a property owner who the government singles out from the
community at large. In this situation, the consequence of burdening a prop-
erty owner is not to place that owner at a competitive disadvantage in the
marketplace. Rather, the consequence is to benefit the public by requiring
that a private party either supply a public facility, service, or function or
correct a general societal evil. If a burdened property owner did not cause
the societal need the government sought to remedy, a court should conclude
that the regulation effected a taking because that circumstance violates the
principle of horizontal equity within the Takings Clause.
Unlike horizontal equity within equal protection, which involves inequal-
ities among actors in the market system, horizontal equity within the Tak-
ings Clause protects against inequalities caused by government regulation
outside the market system."' A nonmarket-based equality principle is con-
sistent with Armstrong's explanation of the Takings Clause. It is both unfair
and unconstitutional for a regulation to discriminate invidiously between a
property owner and the public in order to bring about some public
nonmarket-based benefit. "[Members of the] public as a whole" '214 should
bear equally the costs of those benefits. This principle is also consistent with
Rawls's view of equality, which requires that permissible inequalities benefit
everyone."' If property owners who are not the cause of a problem must
correct it, they supply a benefit to the public and are not treated equivalently
to similarly situated members of the public.
209 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981).
210 Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 313-15.
211 Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303-05.
212 See Note, supra note 70, at 1036.
213 Id. at 1044-45. The different roles of horizontal equity in the Equal Protection and
Takings Clauses help explain why one cannot rely on only the Equal Protection Clause
to address the "singling out" problem. Cf. Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077,
1138 (1993).
214 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
215 Raymond, supra note 16, at 604-05.
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2. Takings and the Singling-Out Prohibition
Although the Takings Clause's "fairness" requirement involves horizon-
tal equity, and although it is related to (though not identical to) the purposes
underlying the Equal Protection Clause, it demands more from a regulation
than general equality between the public and a burdened property owner.
Both the Supreme Court and legal commentators have acknowledged that
fairness requires that regulations of private property evenly distribute a bur-
den among similarly situated landowners. To avoid a taking, a law must not
"localize" the burdens of a public policy if no causative relationship exists
between a regulated, privately owned location and an otherwise valid public
policy.
216
This component of fairness questions whether a private property regula-
tion is discriminatory and thus produces a result equivalent to "reverse spot"
zoning, which arbitrarily burdens a particular parcel for different, less favor-
able treatment than similar neighboring parcels. This kind of discrimination
violates the "singling-out prohibition," which stems from Rawls's require-
ment that minority populations receive protection and that any inequalities
ultimately benefit all.217 The prohibition also derives from the Court's ob-
servation that an uncompensated taking results from requiring that individual
property owners bear the cost of advancing the public interest, especially if
targeted owners have not, in comparison to other property owners, uniquely
contributed to the addressed societal problem.218 Nollan explicitly recog-
nized the singling-out prohibition when it warned,
If the Nollans were being singled out to bear the burden of
California's attempt to remedy [the problem of congestion on
public beaches], although they had not contributed to it more
than other coastal landowners, the State's action... might
216 See Torres, supra note 59, at 17 ("The Takings Clause was designed to prevent
the government from localizing all of the burdens of a particular public policy.").
217 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 60-62.
218 See; e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20 (1987) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) ("[If] the owner's use of the property is (or, but for
the regulation, would be) the source of the social problem, it cannot be said that he has
been singled out unfairly."); Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regu-
latory Takings: Toward a New Theory of Takings Jurisprudence, 40 AM. U. L. REV.
297, 351 (1990) (commenting on how the Court in Armstrong recognized a constitution-
al limitation to singling out "isolated individuals [to] . . . subsidize general social pro-
grams").
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violate . . . the incorporated Takings Clause ... 
There are two dimensions to the prohibition within Armstrong's fairness
rationale for the Takings Clause. First, for a regulation to avoid the prohibi-
tion, a nexus must exist between the burden a regulation places on a particu-
lar property owner (or owners) and the contemplated property use that trig-
gered the regulation."' This nexus exists, and an owner is not unfairly sin-
gled out, if the causation test is satisfied. Causation demands that a pro-
posed property use uniquely contribute to the societal problem targeted by
the regulation that burdens the property owner.
Second, the prohibition helps ensure that the government does not un-
fairly select property to bear losses that should be distributed among the
public generally or among similar but otherwise unregulated parcels of prop-
erty. 2" Without the prohibition, a law may seek to force individual proper-
ty owners to subsidize general societal programs in a manner contrary to
Rawlsian theory and Armstrong. Pennell exemplifies the first situation, in
which the public should bear the cost of the public improvement. In his
partial dissent, Justice Scalia cautioned that the "existence of ... renters
who are too poor to afford even reasonably priced housing" was a "problem
caused by the society at large.""22 Therefore, imposing an economic bur-
den, such as rent restrictions, on one class of property owners, such as land-
lords, to correct this problem unfairly singles them out and effects a tak-
ing. 3
Nollan also involved the second situation, in which the cost of the bene-
fit should be shared among similar properties. In Nollan, the Court identi-
fied the societal problem as beach congestion.224 The Court noted, howev-
er, that the Nollans had "not contributed to it more than other coastal land-
owners." 2' Therefore, the dedication requirement imposed on the Nollans
was an example of the state singling them out to bear the burden of the
government's attempt to remedy the problem. The Court determined that the
requirement was unfair and violated the Takings Clause.
219 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987) (emphasis
added).
220 See John J. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for
the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 465, 488 (1983) (noting that fairness within the
Takings Clause requires "connection between a measure's goals and the burdened
property's use"); Kmiec, supra note 45, at 1651 (arguing that a nexus requirement
should be applied to measure "whether the burden of the regulation is properly placed
on this landowner").
221 See Costonis, supra note 220, at 487.
222 Pennell, 485 U.S. at 21 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
223 Id.
14 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835.
' Id. at 835 n.4.
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C. Takings and the Just-Share Principle
The "just-share" principle is another element of fairness that shares cer-
tain characteristics with the idea of equality but which does not actually
demand that a regulation treat property owners equally in order to avoid the
Takings Clause. That principle holds that it is a presumptive taking when an
individual property owner has borne more than a just share of the cost of
furthering the general public interest.226 The principle is consistent with
Rawls's belief that variations from an equal distribution of wealth are per-
missible if they benefit minority groups by maximizing their share of
society's resources.227 The just-share principle originated in the 1893 Su-
preme Court decision Monogahela Navigation Co. v. United States,22
which foreshadowed the rationale for the Takings Clause set out in
Armstrong:
[The Takings Clause is designed to] prevent[] the public
from loading upon one individual more than his just share of
the burdens of government, and says that when he surrenders
to the public something more and different from that which
is exacted from other members of the public, a full and just
equivalent shall be returned to him.
229
This statement of the just-share principle recognizes lawful imposition of
some losses and burdens without compensation. Justice Holmes conceded
this point in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon23 when he noted that
"[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to prop-
erty could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the
general law."23' The burdens that government cannot constitutionally im-
pose and that violate Monogahela's just-share principle are those that re-
quire that property owners "surrender[] to the public something more and
different from that which is exacted from other members of the public., 232
The "more-and-different-from" test is simply a version of the dispropor-
2 See Coletta, supra note 218, at 351-52; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad
Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1708 (1988).
2 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 61-62.
148 U.S. 312 (1893).
Id. at 325; see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 512 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74, 83 n.7 (1980).
230 Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
23' Id. at 413.
232 Monogahela, 148 U.S. at 325.
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tionate-impact rule applied to regulation. The disproportionate-impact rule
assumes that although laws, particularly exercises of the police power, can
impact individuals, that impact should be proportionate to the individual's
activity that triggers the need for regulation. The rule thereby prevents
policymakers seeking regulation from enjoying benefits in excess of
costs233 or from requiring that regulated property owners bear costs in ex-
cess of benefits."M Indeed, the disproportionate-impact rule and the just-
share principle are the essence of Dolan's "rough-proportionality" test. This
test permits courts to find a taking if no reasonable relationship exists be-
tween an exaction imposed as a condition of government permission for
private property development and the impact of the proposed develop-
ment."'
The just-share principle does not compel equality of burden sharing. 6
Rather, it only demands only that regulations burden property owners with
their "just" or fair share of the costs of advancing the public good. If prop-
erty owner A contributes more to creating a societal problem than neighbor-
ing owner B, the law may impose a greater regulatory burden on A than B.
For example, if the Nollans had wanted permission to build a dock connect-
ing their house to the ocean, that obstruction to the public's lateral access
along the beach would be "more and different from" other neighboring
coastal landowners who do not have, nor desire, such docks. In this situa-
tion, the Nollans also would have caused a societal problem by blocking
lateral movement along the beach. Thus, the Nollans' just share of their
burden of promoting the public's interest in lateral beach access would not
be equal to their neighbors'.
When the government requires that one property owner shoulder more
than a fair or just share of a public burden, the Takings Clause reme-
dy--compensation-redistributes economic cost from property owners to the
public. If a land-use regulation violates the just-share principle, the primary
exception to the Constitution's compensation remedy is the situation in
which a regulation provides an owner with offsetting benefits. Part V dis-
cusses this "reciprocity of advantage" exception.
23 Such policymakers become, in effect, free riders, because they experience a bene-
fit paid by a third party rather than by the beneficiaries.
"3 See Richard A. Epstein, Taxation, Regulation, and Confiscation, 20 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 433, 438 (1982). Lower courts used the "rough-proportionality" variant of the
just-share principle in considering the constitutionality of exactions long before Dolan.
See, e.g., Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976);
Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of Plainfied, 379 A.2d 200 (N.H. 1977).
" Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
236 For a contrary and incorrect view, see Note, supra note 70, at 1045 (commenting
on "[tihe equality of burden sharing promoted by Armstrong").
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V. SATISFYING THE FAIRNESS-EQUALrry STANDARD
When the Rawlsian-Armstrong fairness and equality standard is not met,
it is typically because the regulation fails to meet two takings tests. First, an
unconstitutional regulation is one that does not require a causal nexus be-
tween a proposed property use and a societal problem that it addresses.
Second, an unconstitutional regulation is one that is inconsistent with hori-
zontal equity, the singling-out prohibition, or the just-share principle. Con-
versely, the standard may be satisfied, and compensation unnecessary, if a
regulation satisfies one of three conditions: (1) the use of property subject to
regulation caused the problem that the regulation seeks to correct; (2) if cau-
sation is absent or attenuated, the burdened property owner received an
offsetting reciprocal benefit from the regulation; or (3) if causation is mar-
ginal, the regulation arises from a public program that adjusts the benefits
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.
A. The Presence of Causation
Traditional land-use regulation satisfies the fairness-equality principle
when there is some causal relationship between the private property use
restricted by the regulation and the societal evil that the regulation intends to
remedy.237 So long as an owner's property use is, or may be, the source of
a societal problem, no violation of Armstrong's "singling out" prohibition
occursY The presence of two conditions precedes finding a causation
nexus sufficient to permit, without compensation, either restrictions on prop-
erty use or affirmative obligations on property owners. 9 First, the societal
problem a regulation addresses must originate with some current or project-
ed property use by its owner." ° Second, a regulation must be designed so
that it-has a reasonable likelihood of benefiting the groups that would other-
wise bear the loss or cost of that use 41
The easiest way to meet this nexus test is for a government regulator to
(1) identify an existing or proposed property use that will result in, or has
produced, a negative consequence that a specific class of people will experi-
ence, and (2) select a regulation of that use that will eliminate or ameliorate
the consequence. For example, consider the case of a new subdivision
7 See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
238 Id. at 20.
Id. (noting that there must be "a cause-and-effect relationship between the proper-
ty use [subject to] the regulation and the social evil that the regulation seeks to reme-
dy").
2 Id. at 20-21.
24 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392-95 (1994).
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whose population will increase traffic on an existing highway leading to the
subdivision. A local government may require that the subdivision's devel-
oper help widen that highway by dedicating land adjacent to the highway,
paying fees to the government for road-widening purposes, or constructing
and paying for additional traffic lanes. These requirements would not be
takings because they simply compel an owner to eliminate a public problem
directly created by the owner's property use. The government would be able
to meet the two conditions necessary to establish a causative nexus: (1) the
developer's decision to build the subdivision caused the societal problem of
increased traffic, and (2) the regulation that will burden the property owner
(dedication, fees, or construction obligations) will likely remedy the prob-
lem.2
42
Conversely, a regulation would be a taking if the police power addressed
a societal problem that neither caused nor was capable of being corrected,
through the chosen regulation. u3 If a local government imposed a fee on a
developer to help build new government offices in order to replace outdated
existing offices, this action would be a taking. The problem of outdated
offices would not be attributable to the subdivider, and the societal evil that
the subdivider caused-the increased traffic volume on the existing high-
way-would not be remedied by the fee-for-new-offices requirement. This
particular fee suffers from an additional defect: the fee aids neither an iden-
tifiable class of persons nor the community-at-large; rather it affects the
government.
If the primary beneficiary of a regulation is not a discrete group but
instead the general public, the rule is the same-a regulation may compel an
owner to eliminate a public evil created by an owner's property use, but
cannot require the owner to "act only to promote the public interest by pro-
242 Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606, 610-11 (Cal.
1971); Ayres v. City Council, 207 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1949); Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South
Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 903 (Utah 1981); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls,
137 N.W.2d 442, 447-49 (Wis. 1965); see also Garneau v. City of Seattle, 897 F. Supp.
1318, 1326 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (stating that landlords may be required to pay one-half
the cost of relocating displaced low-income tenants where the amount to be paid was
proportionate to the number of displaced persons displaced by the landlords); 2 PHILLIP
NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN §6.16[3] at 6-109 (J. Sackman & P. Rohan
eds. 1985); William Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1057, 1061 (1980); Theodore C. Taub, Exactions, Linkages, and Regulato-
ry Takings: The Developer's Perspective, 20 URBAN LAW 515, 521-33 (1988).
23 See, e.g., Pioneer Trust and Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d
799 (I11. 961); Coronado Dev. Co. v. City of McPherson, 368 P.2d 51 (Kan. 1962);
Divan Builders Inc. v. Planning Bd., 334 A.2d 30 (N.J. 1975). Many of the cases strik-
ing down exactions as violating the Takings Clause did so after adopting the strict "spe-
cifically and uniquely attributable" causation test. In Dolan, the Supreme Court rejected
this test as commanding a too "exacting correspondence" between the exaction and the
need created by the property use. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389.
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viding without cost something the public wants."2" If a restriction address-
es a problem whose removal will benefit the public, a targeted property
owner may be burdened. The burden, however, may extend only to that
owner's fair share of the public benefit. Furthermore, that fair share must
arise from the specific use of property that contributes to the problem. 5
In Keystone,"6 the Court sustained the Pennsylvania Subsidence Act's
restrictions on private coal production because the state was "acting to pro-
tect the public interest in health, the environment, and the fiscal integrity of
the area" 7 from "subsidence ... caused by the extraction of underground
coal." " Moreover, the Act required that the coal company keep in place
only that quantity necessary to prevent subsidence, which entailed less than
two percent of the total coal the company owned.2"
Similarly, the Court rejected a takings challenge to a federal statute
imposing liability on employers withdrawing from a multi-employer pension
plan in Concrete Pipe & Products, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension
Trust,"0 mainly because the plaintiff could not show "its withdrawal liabil-
ity ... to be 'out of proportion to its experience with the plan."' 2 Laws
authorizing a government to take property without compensation in the face
of compelling necessity will be upheld only if the restriction "extends no
further than the emergency which creates it.'
252
A combination of the fair-share and causative-link requirements likely
will prevent governments from requiring land to be left substantially in a
natural state in order to secure legitimate but diffuse public environmental
benefits. Although earlier cases upheld orders by government agencies pro-
hibiting private development of ecologically sensitive lands, such as
wetlands, alluvial valleys and shorelines, 3 recently, parties successfully
See FRED BOSSELMAN E7 AL., THE TAKING ISSUE 206, 292 (1973); Dunham,
supra note 176, at 75.
45 See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 158 U.S. 312, 325 (1893)
(stating that the Takings Clause should prevent "the public from loading upon one indi-
vidual more than his just share of the burdens of government"); Costonis, supra note
220, at 487 (noting that "compensable takings will still be found when government is
unable to establish the linkage required of the just-share principle").
26 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); see supra
Part II.A.
27 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 488.
24 Id. at 474 (emphasis added).
2A9 Id. at 498.
' Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S.
602 (1993).
2" Id. at 645.
252 Home v. City of Cordele, 230 S.E.2d 333, 335 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976); see United
States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 179-84 (1958) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing); United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952) (Black & Douglas, J.J., dissent-
ing).
2" See, e.g., Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
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have asserted that the Takings Clause protects the right of private parties to
develop their property, despite the threat posed to these sensitive lands. In
Lucas, 4 the Court voided a prohibition against building certain residences
along a shoreline, irrespective of the conceded public interest in shoreline
protection that the restriction would further.2" The Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit has found the United States liable for compensation
under the Takings Clause when a federal law (1) prevented a mining com-
pany from developing a coal field under an otherwise protected alluvial
valley floor,2" or (2) blocked land development and reclamation projects
affecting environmentally fragile wetlands.257 In these situations, the fact
that the restriction would further the general public interest in environmental
quality could not justify government action that "single[d] out a few proper-
ty owners to bear burdens, while benefits are spread widely across the com-
munity.""
A government regulation can impose on property owners their propor-
tionate share of the costs of correcting a societal problem that their property
use caused if the primary beneficiaries of the correction are a discrete group
of persons or the general public. What seems completely impermissible is a
situation in which a regulation causes a transfer of private property rights to
the government itself in order to benefit specially or augment a real property
interest owned by the government.259 For example, in Connolly v. Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp.,2 ° the Supreme Court denied a takings challenge
against a federal law that required that an employer withdrawing from a
multiemployer pension plan pay the employer's proportionate share of the
plan's unfunded vested benefits. The Court found it important that "the
United States has taken nothing for its own use."' Conversely, several
state courts have found takings when local laws restricting private property
uses worked to benefit land owned by the government.22
Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. CI. 1981); Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991), rev'd, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Just v.
Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
"' Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003; see supra Part II.A.
255 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018 (stating that regulations that "requir[e] land to be left
substantially in its natural state-carry with them a heightened risk that private property
is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious
public harm").
256 Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
25. Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Florida Rock Indus., Inc.
v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
25 Creppel, 41 F.3d at 631.
'9 See Stoebuck, supra note 242, at 1092-94.
260 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986).
261 Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
262 See, e.g., Hageman v. Board of Trustees, 251 N.E.2d 507 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969)
(finding that a regulation benefiting an air force base was a taking); Miller v. City. of
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TAKINGS AND CAUSATION
When the effects of a regulation benefit a governmental entity in the use
of land in which it holds incidents of ownership, one need not address the
causative issue in order to determine if a taking occurred. This is because
the regulation requires that the burdened property owner furnish a govern-
ment benefit rather than a public benefit. The plain language of the Takings
Clause demands compensation in this case, in which the government literal-
ly took private property for "public use.
263
B. When Causation Is Absent or Attenuated
1. Reciprocity of Advantage
One exception to a causation requirement of the Takings Clause occurs
when a regulation abridges ownership rights while addressing a societal
problem that an owner's exercise of a property right did not cause but in-
stead, it secures for the owner an "average reciprocity of advantage."'
Reciprocity of advantage may be present when a law offsets a decrease in
property value that results from the law's application to a particular parcel
with an increase in value that stems from its general application to similar
properties.265 Reciprocity of advantage also may be present when a proper-
ty owner who has suffered burdens as a result of a regulation receives cer-
tain benefits from the same law.'
The genesis of the reciprocity defense lies in nineteenth century cases
that calculated just compensation subject to exercise of eminent domain.
These early state courts assumed that when the government exercised emi-
nent domain to acquire part of a parcel of private land, payment for that
property could be reduced by the increase in value that accrued to the re-
mainder of the parcel as a result of the condemnation. 7 When municipal
Beaver Falls, 82 A.2d 34 (Pa. 1951) (finding that a regulation benefiting a future city-
owned park was a taking).
263 See Sax, supra note 15, at 63.
264 Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
See Penn Cent. Transp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 139-49 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
266 United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 60 (1989); Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.21 (1987); Student Loan Mktg. Ass'n v.
Riley, 104 F.3d 397, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1997). There is some conflict over whether there
should be a balance between the benefits and burdens of a regulation or whether a regu-
lation's benefits may be considerably less than its burdens. See, e.g., Jackson v.
Rosenbaum, 260 U.S. 22, 30 (1922).
27 See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLI-
TICS 80-82 (1995); Harry N. Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the
Concept of Public Purpose in State Courts, in LAw IN AMERICAN HISTORY 329, 364
(Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971).
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governments impesed comprehensive land-use-planning regulations, espe-
cially zoning, throughout the early twentieth century, landowners' property
values theoretically increased because of a regulation that segregated incom-
patible uses." s These benefits served two constitutional functions in a reg-
ulatory context by providing: (1) a justification for the exercise of the police
power, and (2) sufficient compensation under the Takings Clause that
justified reductions in value from the restrictions on land use.269
a. The Holmes-Brandeis Paradigms
i. Justice Holmes's Limited View of Reciprocity
Justice Holmes conceived the reciprocity-of-advantage defense as
blocking constitutional challenges to a land-use restriction when two condi-
tions were present. First, the regulated property owner must have caused the
problem subject to the regulation. Second, because the burden the regulation
imposed equaled the benefit derived therefrom, there was no uncompensated
taking of the owner's property. For example, in the 1914 case of Plymouth
Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania,27° coal mine owners challenged a state law that
required that a pillar of coal remain along the border of adjoining property.
Speaking for the Court, Holmes concluded that this law was not an uncon-
stitutional taking because the problem the law addressed-worker safety in
adjoining mines-was a direct result of the mining activities of coal mine
owners subject to the regulation, and all of the coal miners burdened by the
regulation also would receive an in-kind "average reciprocity of advantage"
from it because adjacent mines would not threaten their mines.27
In contrast, in Pennsylvania Coal, Holmes found that the law at issue
had worked an uncompensated taking because the second of the two condi-
tions was unmet." The anti-surface subsidence statute attacked in Penn-
sylvania Coal required some coal to remain in situ to protect surface dwell-
ings from the effects of underground coal extraction.273 The coal mine
owners caused the surface subsidence, but unlike the owners in Plymouth
Coal, Holmes thought that the coal mine owners in Pennsylvania Coal did
not receive any benefit from the law.274 Instead, the surface owners were
' See HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 237, 246 (Cal. 1975), for a modern
explanation of the reciprocity of advantage rationale. Earlier cases relying on the ratio-
nale include Cockran v. Preston, 70 A. 113 (Md. 1908), and Piper v. Ekern, 194 N.W.
159 (Wis. 1923).
269 See Coletta, supra note 218, at 302.
270 232 U.S. 531 (1914).
271 Id. 232 U.S. at 540.
272 Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-14 (1922).
273 See id. at 412.
274 Id. at 413-14.
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the beneficiaries.275 In effect, the law transferred property from coal mine
owners to surface owners, which prevented coal mine owners from securing
an average reciprocity of advantage.276 Read together, Holmes's opinions
in Plymouth Coal and Pennsylvania Coal limit application of the defense. In
order for a reciprocity-of-advantage defense to defeat a takings challenge,
burdened parties must have caused the harm that the regulation addresses
and have received in-kind benefits for their losses in the transaction.277
ii. Brandeis's Expansion on the Notion of Reciprocity
Justice Brandeis's dissent in Pennsylvania Coal argues for significantly
broadening the scope of the reciprocity-of-advantage defense. Brandeis ar-
gued that the defense could justify a law whose purpose was to confer a
benefit upon the general neighborhood or to protect the public from "detri-
ment or danger."278 In the latter case, when the public interest was impli-
cated, Brandeis suggested that there need be no nexus between the burden
and the benefit. His notion of average reciprocity would be satisfied if a
property owner affected by a regulation received in return only "the advan-
tage of living and doing business in a civilized community" subject to prop-
erty restrictions that furthered the general public welfare.279 Brandeis's po-
sition is a classic utilitarian view of government."
This attenuated connection between restrictions on property use and
public advantages gained thereby could, in theory, justify regulations that
would fail under the Holmes model. Brandeis was unconcerned about
whether there is a causative link between the property subject to regulation
and the goal of the regulation. The primary issue under Brandeis's formula
is whether a regulation accomplishes a public purpose. If it does, it is irrele-
vant that the affected owner experiences intangible and diffuse benefits. It is
enough that the restriction will provide the owner with the advantages of
living in a society in which the police power restricts property for the good
of the general community to which the owner belongs."
The contrasting Holmes- and Brandeis-reciprocity paradigms have
played a significant role in takings jurisprudence since 1978." Between
1978 and 1987, the Brandeis-utilitarian view dominated the Court's deci-
275 Id. at 414.
276 Id. at 415.
277 See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 SuP. Cr. REV.
1, 22.
271 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
279 Id.
See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
2' See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949) (stating that
some regulations of property survive takings challenges because they are "properly
treated as part of the burden of common citizenship"); Note, supra note 70, at 1041.
282 See generally Coletta, supra note 218, at 327-42.
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sions. In 1978, in Penn Central, the Court sustained a landmark preservation
law despite the fact that the law not only deprived the property owner of its
right to build on its property but also did not impose similar restrictions on
all properties within a particular location. What was important to the Court
was that the law benefited the entire community "by improving the quality
of life."" 3 This is the Brandeis notion of reciprocity of advantage. Accord-
ing to Penn Central (and Brandeis), governments can assert the reciprocity
defense to takings challenges if the benefits were public, rather than in-kind
or private, and inured to the affected property owner simply by its
membership in the community where the regulation applied.
In subsequent takings cases, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the utilitarian
belief that reciprocity sufficient to defeat a takings claim could be present if
a law conferred benefits on society and the burdened property owner lived
in that society. In Andrus v. Allard,' the Court justified a restriction on
property by referencing Brandeis's explanation in Pennsylvania Coal that
property owners must "bear the... burden [of regulation] to secure 'the
advantage of ... doing business in a civilized community."'" In Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 6 the Court upheld a restrictive land use law, in part, be-
cause it believed that the landowner and the public benefited from a law that
"serv[ed] the city's interest in assuring careful and orderly develop-
ment."
7
Two 1987 cases pushed the outer boundaries of the reciprocity of advan-
tage concept. In Keystone, the Court upheld an anti-subsidence statute virtu-
ally identical to the one deemed to be a taking in Pennsylvania Coal.'
The Court assumed that the government could assert successfully the reci-
procity defense even when the benefits received and the burdens imposed
did not originate in the same legislation and were grossly unequal such that
regulatory burdens far outweighed benefits the coal owners experienced? 9
In Hodel v. Irving,2" the Court voided a federal statute that abolished the
right of members of an American Indian tribe to transfer property to their
heirs. The court found that the law destroyed an essential property
right-the right of descent and devise. 9 Nonetheless, apart from this de-
fect, the majority noted that the statute would have encompassed an average
reciprocity of advantage sufficient to sustain the law because it was intended
283 Penn Cent. Transp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 139-49 (1976).
284 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
2 Id. at 67.
26 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
287 Id. at 262.
2"8 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
289 Id. at 491 n.21; Coletta, supra note 218, at 338-39.
290 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
291 Id. at 716.
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to benefit the tribe as a whole.292 Similarly, in Penn Central and Andrus,
the Court considered that the property owners impacted by the regulations
received sufficient advantage through their citizenship in a community that
the regulation benefited.293
These decisions not only embrace the Brandeis-utilitarian view of reci-
procity, they also advance an argument that even Brandeis did not en-
dorse-that restrictions on property that confer any benefit on society pro-
vide affected property owners with an average reciprocity of advantage.
Under this view, virtually all legislation that somehow advances public
health, safety, or welfare supplies to an affected property owner sufficient
compensation to stop a takings challenge because the owner is a member of
the general public. Moreover, under Keystone's variant of reciprocity, the
advantage that the burdened property owner experienced need not result
from the legislation that created the burden.
If this had remained the Court's position, the causation requirement
would have been gutted. Causation requires some linkage and proportionali-
ty between private use of property, a resulting societal problem, and a regu-
lation designed to address the problem. A broadened reciprocity of advan-
tage defense permits a court to uphold a law that largely destroys the value
of an owner's property so long as the law provides diffuse benefits to the
entire community. It is then largely irrelevant whether the owner's use of
property would have prevented the community from experiencing this bene-
fit but for the regulation.
iii. Readoption of the Holmes Model
Throughout the period when the reciprocity of advantage defense
dominated, some Justices continued to voice strong disagreement with the
expansion of that doctrine. In vigorous dissents, often by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, a minority of the Court argued that the two conditions first artic-
ulated by Justice Holmes defined the scope of the reciprocity defense: (1)
the burdened property owner must have caused the societal problem that
precipitated the need for the regulation, and (2) the regulation must provide
to the owner direct, in-kind benefits like those exemplified in Plymouth
Coal.294
The dissent in Penn Central questioned the majority's failure to adopt or
apply either condition. First, the dissent argued that under the challenged
landmark designation law, only a handful of properties designated official
landmarks, but these properties were only marginally responsible for any
possible threat to the historical and aesthetic character of New York
292 Id. at 715-16.
293 See supra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
294 See supra notes 230-34 and accompanying text.
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City.295 Therefore, relying on Armstrong, the dissent concluded that the
plaintiff's property was unfairly "singled out and treated differently from
surrounding buildings." '296 This meant that the law improperly had imposed
"the cost associated with the city of New York's desire to preserve...
'landmarks' . . . on the owners of ... individual properties [instead of on]
all of its taxpayers." '297
Second, the dissent maintained that the reciprocity of advantage defense
should not have applied because "the landmark designation impose[d] upon
[the plaintiff] a substantial cost, [and there was] little or no offsetting benefit
except for the honor of the designation. 298
To satisfy the reciprocity of advantage defense, the Penn Central dissent
rejected the Brandeis rationale, which assumes that "the advantage of...
doing business in a civilized community" is sufficient.2' It instead adopted
Holmes's view, which permits the reciprocity defense only if "[a]ll property
owners in a designated area are placed under the same restrictions,... for
the benefit of ... one another."' This statement is fully consistent with
John Rawls's belief that "social and economic inequalities are to be ar-
ranged so that they are ... reasonably expected to be to everyone's advan-
tage.3
01
In his dissent in Keystone, Rehnquist again criticized the majority for its
failure to address Holmes's two conditions. The challenged anti-surface
subsidence legislation had "load[ed] upon [the coal companies] more than
[its] just share of the burdens of government.""3 2 Therefore, the legislation
failed to satisfy both the "fair-share" and causation requirements. Moreover,
the Keystone dissent warned of the possible consequences of the majority's
broad interpretation of reciprocity of advantage. If lawmakers successfully
could invoke the defense simply by acting in pursuit of broadly applicable
health, safety, or welfare protection, government surely would have "much
greater authority than we have recognized to impose societal burdens on
individual landowners., 30 3
Justice Rehnquist's admonitions commanded a majority of the Court in
295 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138-39 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that the plaintiff's property was one of 400 buildings
out of more than one million buildings "singled out" for designation).
296 Id. at 140.
297 Id. at 139.
298 Id.
299 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
3 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 140.
301 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 60 (emphasis added).
302 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 512 (1987)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
303 Id. at 513.
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Nollan. As discussed in Part II," the Court in Nollan found a taking after
applying Armstrong's causation requirement.0 5 It also refused to adopt the
Brandeis notion of reciprocity of advantage. The Court conceded that a
regulation protecting lateral beach access advanced a legitimate state inter-
est." Nevertheless, it was not enough that the burdened property owner
might, as a member of the general public, indirectly share in this benefit by
having marginally more access across state beaches.?w For reciprocity to
exist, the property owner must enjoy some direct, private, in-kind compensa-,
tion as a result of the regulation. The benefit to the Nollans was public and
indirect, and there was no nexus between the proposed use and a societal
problem created by that use that the regulation removed.3 "8 Although in his
dissent Justice Brennan justified the regulation by applying Brandeis's ex-
panded model of reciprocity," the majority adopted Holmes's more nar-
row definition.
Nollan signaled that the Court would no longer use broadened, utilitarian
reciprocity principles to justify property regulation. Justice Scalia's dissent
in Pennell1 and the Court's opinions in Lucas31' and Dolan"' all
point to a return to Holmes's version of reciprocity. In Pennell, the bur-
dened property owners (landlords) contended that a rent control regulation
was a taking because they did not receive direct, in-kind, or indirect benefit
from the regulation.313 The only possible gain that accrued to them was in
their capacity as citizens in a larger community where poor tenants were not
made worse off by high rents."' Although the majority did not address the
merits of this claim, Scalia did. He agreed with the landlords and rejected
the Brandeis-utilitarian-"living-in-a-civilized-community" notion of reciproc-
ity as too tenuous where the burdened property owner did not cause the a
priori poverty some tenants experienced, and the real consequence of the
rent control law was redistribution of a landlord's property to a hardship
See supra Part II.B.
3o Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835-36 n.4, 838-39 (1987)
(citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
306 Id. at 841.
307 Id.
3o8 See id. at 838.
31 Id. at 847-48 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Nollans received benefits
sufficient to satisfy reciprocity demands because, as California citizens, they might
enjoy additional access to the state's beaches).
310 Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 15-24 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); see supra Part II.B.
311 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see supra Part
II.B.
"' Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); see supra Part II.B.
313 Pennell, 485 U.S. at 9.
314 Id. at 13.
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tenant.315 Indeed, the regulation in Pennell was more similar to the law
found to effect a taking in Pennsylvania Coal."6 In both cases, the gov-
ernment actions did not bring about reciprocity because they transferred
wealth from the burdened property owner to a limited class of beneficiaries
rather than working toward accomplishing some broad public purpose.317
This type of wealth transfer also violates Rawls's principles of equality and
justice."'
The Court's Lucas and Dolan opinions underscored the relevance of
causation and the relative irrelevance of reciprocity after Nollan and Scalia's
Pennell dissent. In Lucas,319 Justice Stevens, the author of the majority
opinion in Keystone, dissented. In attempting to resurrect Keystone's ex-
panded notion of reciprocity,3" Justice Stevens used the utilitarian argu-
ment that the law in question was valid because it served an important pub-
lic purpose and was a general statewide policy.32' The legitimate environ-
mental goal of shoreline protection therefore would benefit an owner whose
property was subject to the regulation because the owner would be a citizen
of a state with less eroded shorelines.322 According to Stevens, the general-
ity of the law prevented the state from violating the fair share principle be-
cause it could not load "upon one individual more than his just share of the
burdens of government.
323
The majority in Lucas rejected this argument. After Lucas, if a regula-
tion "specifically directed to land use" deprives land of all economically
viable use, it is still a taking, regardless of the importance of its purpose or
its generality.3" By ignoring Brandeis's vision of reciprocity, which Jus-
tice Stevens advanced, and by discounting generality as a justification for
oppressive laws, Lucas served notice that reciprocity of advantage likely
315 Id. at 21-22.
316 See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); supra notes 2, 193 and
accompanying text.
3" The parallels between the regulations challenged in Pennsylvania Coal and
Pennell are striking. The critical point in Pennsylvania Coal was that the statute caused
a transfer of rights from one finite class of property interests (coal owners) to another
(surface owners). See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is
Still a Muddle, 57 So. CAL. L. REV. 561, 580-81 (1984). Apart from lacking a caus-
ative nexus between the societal problem and the affected property owners, the problem
with the rent control law in Pennell was that it also caused a wealth transfer--between
the property owners (the landlords) and a limited class of beneficiaries (poor tenants).
318 See supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
319 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 486 (1987).
321 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1075 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1071-72 (quoting Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S.
312, 325 (1893)).
32 Id. at 1027 n.14 (emphasis added).
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would be a successful defense only if the benefits to a burdened owner are
private, direct, and in-kind.
Dolan completed the Court's return to a more modest Holmesian notion
of reciprocity. The city's regulation of Mrs. Dolan's property was a taking
because the city failed to demonstrate that her proposed property use would
cause a public evil (flooding and traffic congestion) that was proportionate
to the burden imposed on her (requiring her to dedicate property for a storm
drainage system and a bicycle and pedestrian pathway). 3" Two aspects of
the opinion strongly indicate that the Court no longer accepts Brandeis's
argument that a regulation could still impose these burdens on Mrs. Dolan
because she received certain reciprocal benefits from it. First, the majority
explicitly noted that no matter how "laudable" (and general) the city's goals
of reducing flood and traffic hazards, it was still improper to saddle Mrs.
Dolan with more than her fair share of the cost of attaining these goals.3"
Second, Justice Stevens's dissent, rather than the majority, made the case for
Brandeis's view of reciprocity.3" With the Dolan decision, it appears that
the Court has readopted the limiting conditions to the reciprocity defense
that Justice Holmes first advanced in Pennsylvania Coal.
b. The Proper Scope of the Reciprocity Defense
There are two views of the reciprocity of advantage defense. Holmes's
version permits a government regulation to survive a takings challenge if
there is some evidence that a party whom the regulation burdens caused the
societal problem that the regulation addresses, and that party received direct,
in-kind compensation.3" The alternative, Brandeis's version, is less con-
cerned with causation and focuses instead on whether the regulation produc-
es a general benefit that the burdened property owner will share.329 This
model assumes a more expansive definition of reciprocity. If the benefits are
purely public, a property owner, as a member of the public, will receive
sufficient compensation from those diffuse benefits to prevent a successful
takings challenge. One early Supreme Court decision summarized Brandeis's
notion of reciprocity when it concluded that even if a landowner experi-
enced a financial loss from a regulation, the regulation was not a taking if
the owner was "compensated for it by sharing in the general benefits which
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389-95 (1994).
326 Id. at 386-88.
327 Id. at 397-401 (Stevens, I., dissenting) (arguing that reciprocity sufficient to reject
the takings claim exists because Mrs. Dolan "gains ... [by] the village's approval of
the subdivision plat [which enables the subdivider to profit financially]," and she will
realize "considerable benefits [because her property is] immediately adjacent to the
creek[, which might flood but for the regulation]").
31 See supra Part V.B.L.a.i.
329 See supra Part V.B.l.a.ii.
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the regulations are intended and calculated to secure.""33
One policy justification for Brandeis's view of reciprocity lies in the
argument that private property derives value from the legal rules that pro-
vide the security necessary for the property market to operate.331 Property
owners benefit from these rules, which permit them to increase the worth of
their property in a marketplace in which the law enforces property transac-
tions. If property depends on law, regulations of property based on law offer
regulated owners reciprocal advantages because such regulations are merely
part of a larger legal regime that already has benefited the owners.
A utilitarian would argue that private-property value is closely linked to
its societal context. Without a healthy socio-economic structure, private
property would yield little economic return. Therefore, when a regulation
affects property rights in order to bring about a better society, the property
owner already has gained from being in an organized, civilized society and
will gain additional benefits if the regulation further improves the general
societal setting.332 For example, an environmental rule restricting property
uses may limit the economic potential of a parcel of property, but by sup-
plying the entire community with improved environmental quality, the rule
allows an owner to enjoy the benefit of a clean environment. In the long
run, property rights may be more valuable if they exist in a clean, rather
than a degraded, environmental context.333
Although the argument that property owners occasionally must sacrifice
their economic self-interest in order to enjoy the benefits of a governed and
organized society is superficially appealing, this utilitarian view of the reci-
procity defense suffers from several serious defects. First, a regulation that
appears to benefit the public may mask a wealth transfer from one class of
property owners to another. As Part VI discusses more fully, private sector
reassignments of ownership rights are constitutionally suspect because they
often result from a rule that compels certain targeted individuals to receive
privately subsidized societal programs.3" This 'result is inconsistent with
the "justice" principle that Rawls and Armstrong advance.335
330 L'Hote v. City of New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 599 (1900).
331 See generally Coletta, supra note 218, at 362-64.
332 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1275
(N.Y. 1977) ("[Slociety as an organized entity, especially through its government, rather
than as a mere conglomerate of individuals, has created much of the value of ... prop-
erty.").
313 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 399-400 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
334 But see John A. Humbach, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Take Private
Property: Public Purpose and Public Use, 66 OR. L. REV. 547, 585-86 (1988) (stating
that regulatory transfers from private persons to other private persons are noncompensa-
ble).
... See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
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Second, Brandeis's version of reciprocity risks removing causation as an
element in the takings calculation. If reciprocity exists because a regulation
benefits society generally by removing a societal evil, the government may
require that a property owner with only a tenuous connection to that societal
problem help furnish the public benefit without receipt of compensation.
Causation should not be irrelevant, however. If the burdened property owner
did not cause the societal problem that a regulation intends to remedy, that
owner is being singled out to bear the cost of advancing the public interest.
Armstrong's fairness rule and Rawls's equality principle correctly demand
that a government not force these private property owners to contribute
more than their fair share of the public burden.336
Third, Brandeis's model, taken to its logical extreme, as in Keystone,
effectively would swallow the Takings Clause so long as a regulation bur-
dening private property in some fashion advanced the public interest. In
Keystone, the "advantage" the property owner enjoyed did not result from
the statute that created the burden.337 So long as a statute confers any ben-
efits on the society in which an owner exists, reciprocity would be present,
and no taking would result. The government could then circumvent its just-
compensation duty simply by providing some reciprocal benefits to the gen-
eral community, even if the reciprocal value to the property owner was far
less than what just compensation requires. This would lead to the anomalous
result that a property regulation reasonably related to a public purpose could
never be a taking.
It would be inconsistent with the text and purpose of the Takings Clause
to adopt this approach. Pennsylvania Coal held that a government's other-
wise proper exercise of regulatory authority does not, and should not, pre-
clude a finding that such action is a compensable taking.338 Indeed, the
Takings Clause already assumes that the government is acting in the public
interest. A broad application of reciprocity of advantage improperly would
give lawmakers essentially free rein to affect adversely property values
while pursuing the traditional police power ends of health, safety, and wel-
fare.3 39
Although a government defendant can raise a reciprocity-of-advantage
defense, the reciprocity should be Holmes's version. A government should
not require particular property owners to subsidize desired public programs
331 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 226, at 1707-08.
331 See supra notes 303-04 and accompanying text.
338 Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
... See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 513 (1987)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S.
121, 126-27 (1985); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,
649-52 (1981) (Brennan, J. dissenting); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
172 (1979); Yancey v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also
Rubenfeld, supra note 139, at 1137-38 (1993).
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unless the targeted owners have somehow uniquely contributed to the need
for the regulation. Reciprocity sufficient to defeat a takings claim requires
that the owners receive a direct in-kind benefit rather one due solely to their
membership in the general community. This is the better rule, and the one
that the Supreme Court and many lower courts have now endorsed. 4
2. Adjusting the Benefits and Burdens of Economic Life
Two other situations exist in which a missing or tenuous causal link
between regulation and private-property use may not be constitutionally fatal
under the Takings Clause: (1) where a rule serves an important public inter-
est, or (2) a regulated property owner has actual or imputed knowledge of a
regulatory scheme that might impact the property in the future. When either
of these factual predicates is present, the Court often rejects takings chal-
lenges because the "interference with the property rights of an [owner] aris-
es from a public program that adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic
life to promote the common good." 1
The "adjusting-burdens-and-benefits" rationale permits the Court to
sustain legislation that ordinarily would fail Rawls's equality principle or the
"fairness" component of Armstrong's test because it promotes general wel-
fare by uniquely burdening some people more than others.42 The rationale
also validates certain regulations that otherwise would be uncompensated
takings because they "unjustly" caused transfers of property rights from one
class of persons to another class. If regulations adjusting benefits and bur-
dens of economic life take private rights for the private use of others, those
regulations typically are immune from invalidation under the Takings Clause
340 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987); see also United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S.
52, 63 (1989) ("A governmental body has an obvious interest in making those who
specifically benefit from its services pay the cost .... ") (quoting Massachusetts v.
United States, 435 U.S. 444, 462 (1978) (emphasis added); Student Loan Mktg. Ass'n
v. Riley, 104 F.3d 397, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("If the regulatory action in question ben-
efits the burdened persons, and the amount of the burden is a 'fair approximation of the
costs of benefits supplied,' then no taking is said to have occurred.") (quoting United
States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 60 (1989) (quoting Massachusetts v. United States,
435 U.S. 444, 463 n.19 (1978))); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d
1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
34' Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 608 (1987); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining
Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). The Court cited Usery to justify government interference
with property rights in Keystone, 480 U.S. at 488-89 n.18; Connolly v. Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986); and Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1976). See also Kraebel v. Department of Hous. Preservation
and Dev., 959 F.2d 395, 402 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
342 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133.
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so long as the transfer of rights was designed to bring about some larger
public purposes" or was a reasonably foreseeable risk that the burdened
property owner assumed."'
a. Promotion of the Public Good
Both Lucas and Nollan state that "land-use regulation does not effect a
taking if it 'substantially advance['] legitimate state interests.""' Similar-
ly, the "adjusting-benefits-and-burdens" exception to the Takings Clause ap-
plies if the "adjustment" of private rights promotes the public good.4 6
Taken literally, these two government defenses to takings claims would
remove virtually all chance of success in challenging a burdensome regula-
tion if the regulation simply advanced a legitimate state interest or promoted
the public good. To prevent this result, the Court has circumscribed the
nature and definition of a public benefit that will justify an uncompensated
taking 4 7 Three public interests in particular allow uncompensated adjust-
ment of private rights even when causation is largely absent and the law
reassigns ownership rights from one private owner to another.
First, a countervailing fundamental constitutional interest may outweigh
the exercise of a private property right." For example, in Kirchberg v.
Feenstra,3" the Court approved an uncompensated taking of a mortgagee's
lien. The lien was an encumbrance on a wife's interest in community prop-
erty, but her husband created the lien under a Louisiana community law that
gave a husband, as "head and master," exclusive control over the disposition
of community property.35 The Court found that the lien was a taking and
invalidated it. The lien was invalid, however, because the "head and master"
rule was a form of unconstitutional gender-based discrimination. Similarly,
in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,35' the Court held that a Califor-
nia state court ruling that required owners of private shopping centers to
permit "speech and petitioning" on shopping center premises did not consti-
tute a taking. As in Kirchberg, in which a redistribution of property rights
was tolerable because of equal protection concerns, in PruneYard, the First
Amendment interest outweighed the shopping center owners' property right
of exclusion.
3 See Humbach, supra note 334, at 585-86.
34 Concrete Pipe & Products v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust Fund, 508 U.S.
602, 638-39 (1993).
" Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1024; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834.
346 See supra note 289.
" See infra notes 351-53 and accompanying text.
341 See generally Humbach, supra note 334, at 587-88.
149 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
3-1 Id. at 459-60.
351 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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Second, in times of imminent peril, emergency, or war, the government
may destroy private property without compensating its owners in order to
respond to the crisis. In United States v. Caltex, Inc.,352 the Court consid-
ered whether compensation was due when the retreating United States Army
ordered the destruction of private oil storage facilities in Manila to prevent
their capture by the invading Japanese. In United States v. Central Eureka
Mining Co.,133 the issue was whether the Takings Clause was triggered by
the War Production Board's order that gold mining cease so as to ensure
that hard-rock miners produced ore essential to the war effort. In both cases,
the Court determined that compensation was unnecessary, even though the
property taken did not create the emergency.5 4 In these situations, the
government actions furthered a public interest far more important than eco-
nomic property loss.35
5
Third, legislative redistribution of wealth may be acceptable when a
statute's purpose is to release assets frozen by an existing legal regime. This
type of legislation rejects the assumption that common law arrangements of
property rights are entitlements; rather, legislation that rearranges the distri-
bution of rights and liabilities presumes that proper reallocations of wealth
can result either from private, socio-economic competition or from legal
institutions. When property rights and assets have been locked up so long
that they are not in play in the marketplace, the law should not protect the
status quo; instead, it should change the rules to render the property avail-
able for market transactions.356
Texaco, Inc. v. Short,357 for example, shows how the Supreme Court
validates this type of legislation in the face of a takings challenge. The stat-
ute at issue in Texaco provided that unused mineral interests existing at the
time of its enactment would be extinguished and merged into the surface
interest out of which they were carved unless their owner filed a claim in
the county recorder's office.35 Although the law redistributed mineral in-
terests from subsurface to surface owners,359 it did not work a taking be-
cause it furthered the "legitimate state goal" of "encourag[ing] owners of
mineral interests to develop the potential of those interests."3"
352 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
357 U.S. 155 (1958).
114 Id. at 168-69; Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. at 154-55.
... See Central Eureka, 357 U.S. at 168. It is far more difficult to find an emergency
of such overwhelming necessity as to negate a taking when a government helped create
the circumstances causing the emergency. See Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d
622, 629 (Utah 1990).
356 See Torres, supra note 59, at 3-4, 12-13.
317 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
318 Id. at 518.
359 Id.
31 Id. at 529 (emphasis added).
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The Court employed a similar rationale in Demorest v. City Bank Farm-
ers Trust Co. 61 In Demorest, the Court considered legislation that permit-
ted use of a remainderman's interest in a trust estate in order to make pay-
ments to the life tenant in excess of the trust income.3 62 Despite this redis-
tribution from remainderman to life tenant, there was no unconstitutional
taking because, as with in Texaco, the purpose of the law was to end the
unnecessary rigidity [surrounding] the whole cluster of vexa-
tious problems arising from uses and trusts ... and testa-
mentary directions for accumulations .... [The legislature
should be able] to make further reasonable rules which in its
opinion will expedite and make more equitable the distribu-
tion of millions of dollars of property locked in testamentary
trusts, even if they do affect the values of the various inter-
ests and expectancies under the trust.
363
b. Notice and Assumption of Risk
Another theory permits the government to adjust the benefits and bur-
dens of economic life absent causation if the property owner had an oppor-
tunity to avoid a taking but nonetheless chose to enter a market or partici-
pate in a program in which there was a foreseeable risk that the owner's
property interest might be affected by a change in the law. In this situation
the law presumes that the owner accepted the risk of subsequent regulation
and therefore may not complain when a rule interferes with a property inter-
est placed at risk.3"
This assumption-of-risk rebuttal to takings challenges is most successful
when the burdened property owner has ample notice of the possibility that
the property interest might be burdened by regulation or subject to future
liability. If there is notice, the property owner has no reliance interest and is
said to have assumed the risk of future economic loss. The market also has
discounted for the possibility of a subsequent restraint, so neither an owner
361 321 U.S. 36 (1944).
362 Id. at 37 n.1.
363 Id. at 48-49 (emphasis added).
" See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508
U.S. 602, 639-40 (1993) (holding that employers accepted the foreseeable risk that they
could be liable for withdrawing from a multiemployer pension plan); Norman v. Balti-
more & O.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (holding that a claim to a particular form of
money was subject to an uncompensable risk that Congress would regulate the money
to the detriment of the claimant); Garelick v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 913, 916-17 (2d Cir.
1993) (holding that physicians who voluntarily chose to participate in the Medicare
program cannot claim that the program's price regulation is a taking).
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nor a purchaser can claim a loss in investment.365
Often this notice is actual, particularly if existing legislation explicitly
warns that subsequent retrospective interference with property interests is
possible.366 Sometimes notice may be constructive. For the situation of a
property owner who does business in a highly regulated field, for example,
the Court has held that such an owner "cannot object if the legislative
scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative
end." '367 In either case, the owner's complicity effectively estops a takings
claims when noticed legislation produces an adverse impact on property
interests.
VI. TAKINGS AND "JUSTICE": WHEN GOVERNMENT REGULATION
REDISTRIBUTES WEALTH
"Fairness" and "equality" implicate the question of whether a law sin-
gles out a property owner to bear a burden to correct a problem that the
owner did not create; "justice" addresses the effect of the law on those who
will benefit from it. Justice is absent if a law redistributes privately owned
resources from one property owner or owners to a recipient who has,needs
that likely will be improved by the redistribution but are not attributable to
the impacted owner. Armstrong reminds us that a. forced redistribution of
property from "A" to "B" is precisely what the Takings Clause intends to
prevent."' The Clause uses the adjective "just" because forced redistribu-
tions without compensation do not serve the purposes of justice. 69 John
Rawls concurs. He argues that redistributions of wealth that force an indi-
vidual to bear the cost of a public good are unjust.37 The only intentional
redistributions of wealth permitted are through taxation and inheritance
laws.
371
Part VI explores the kinds of state-mandated wealth transfers which,
absent causation, are so unjust as to give rise to successful takings claims.
365 Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 51 (1994).
366 See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986);
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 732 (1984); Ciampitti
v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 321 (1991); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d
1184, 1191-94 (Ct. CI. 1981).
367 Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645 (quoting FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91
(1958)); Connolly, 475 U.S. at 227; see also Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed
Expectations in Taking Law, 27 URB. LAW. 215, 244-48 (1995).
361 See William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711-12 (1985).
369 BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 28 (1977).
370 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 282-83.
371 Id. at 277.
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These transfers encompass redistributions from either a property owner or a
class of property owners to government, the public, individuals, or a discrete
group. In each case, the question under the Takings Clause is whether some
individuals can be made to shoulder more societal costs than others.
A. Transfers to the Government
Transfers in which a government acquires private rights in its corporate
capacity for its own use or by its designees for public service and utility use
always require compensation.372 The government must pay just compensa-
tion if it takes private title and transfers to itself easements for flood control,
drainage, and access.373 There is almost certainly a taking if a law benefits
a government entity in the use of land in which it holds incidents of owner-
ship374 and if the interest transferred is of the type that, a burdened private
property owner might transfer to another private person.375 For example, it
likely would be a taking if a city passed either an excessively stringent noise
ordinance to benefit a nearby public hospital or a single-family residential
zoning classification in order to prevent private competition with a public
housing project.376
A taking also occurs if a government action causes a transfer of posses-
sion to some government beneficiary.3' In Griggs v. Allegheny
County,378 the Court found a taking because a harm to private land resulted
from congressionally authorized use of air space by jet airplanes.379 The
Court recognized that an airplane approach path over the plaintiff's land
served Allegheny County's airport's interests.3"' Nonetheless, the Court re-
quired that the county compensate the plaintiff because the noise, vibration,
and danger resulting from airplane use of the county airport damaged the
372 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (cable
television); Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78 (1923) (reservoir); Mt. Vernon-
Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30 (1916)
(electric utility); see also Humbach, supra note 334, at 585.
" J.H. Beuscher, Some Tentative Notes on the Integration of Police Power and Emi-
nent Domain by the Courts: So-Called Inverse or Reverse Discrimination, 1 URB. LAW
ANN. 1, 12 (1968).
114 Gus Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth Amend-
ment: Justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 RUTGERS L.J.
15, 29 (1983); Sax, supra note 15, at 67; Stoebuck, supra note 242, at 1092.
... William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV.
553, 605 (1972).
376 Stoebuck, supra note 242, at 1094.
'7 See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 590 (2d. ed. 1988).
378 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
379 Id. at 89; see also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
3' Griggs, 369 U.S. at 81.
1997] 419
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
plaintiff's property, and the county's action effected a transfer of possession
from the plaintiff to the air travelers, which in turn benefited the county air-
port."' The Court also found significant that the landowner in Griggs did
not cause the problem that the government action intended to correct by
building the airport and permitting airplanes to fly over the plaintiff's prop-
erty. The transfer of possession to a government beneficiary plus the ab-
sence of a causal relationship did produced an uncompensated taking.31 2
An important exception to the normal rule against redistributive legisla-
tion that benefits primarily the government is the situation in which tax laws
take money from taxpayers to pay for the government. Such tax laws can be
justified by two characteristics of tax legislation. First, the taxes produce
benefits for the taxpayer, creating an average "reciprocity." Second, taxes
generally do not violate the singling-out prohibition because they typically
spread the burden throughout the entire class of persons whose wealth, prop-
erty, or income level meet the standard for tax liability.383 Rawls agrees
that a government may redistribute wealth through taxation."
B. Transfers to the Public
The redistributive consequences of regulation become more complex if a
regulation's beneficiary is not the government and if the regulation does not
redistribute wealth from one group to another but rather the state takes the
wealth or property of some people for public benefit. The Takings Clause
applies to these situations because, as the Court has reminded us, "The Fifth
Amendment ... undertakes to redistribute certain economic losses inflicted
by public improvements so that they fall upon the public rather than wholly
upon those who happen to lie in the path of the project. 31 5
Most land use and environmental laws burden certain private property
owners in order to bring about a public benefit. These laws include setback
requirements, height regulations, lot and building size controls, restraints on
use by zoning classifications, landmark preservation restrictions, pollution
abatement requirements, wildlife and habitat protection laws, and open-space
preservation rules. Although such laws do not transfer title to the govern-
ment, they do transfer to the public an attribute of private property. Further,
they impose a servitude on private property in which the government, not
other owners, retains the discretion and power to enforce the regulations by
legal action or to rescind the restrictions. A regulatory transfer thereby
grants to the public some general land use or environmental improvement,
Id. at 88-09.
382 See Dunham, supra note 176, at 76.
383 Rubenfeld, supra note 139, at 1137.
"8 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 277.
... United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
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and to the government, it grants a negative easement in gross.3"6
The core question, of course, is whether these regulatory transfers re-
quire just compensation. One would not want to proffer a rule that made all
regulatory transfers compensable, for this would not only ignore the benefits
secured by the burdened property owner as a member of the public but also
likely would halt the execution of many worthwhile exercises of the police
power.3"7 On the other hand, from the property owner's point of view, it
matters little whether the government condemns the land, floods it, or re-
stricts it by an open-space regulation so that it may be used only in its natu-
ral state. All of these government actions take private property for public
use and thereby place the transfer squarely within the language of the Tak-
ings Clause. Moreover, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that it is "the
deprivation of the former owner rather than the accretion of a right or inter-
est to the sovereign [that] constitutes [a] taking." '388
In the case of regulatory transfers, these conflicting pressures are recon-
ciled best by reference to the factors that underscore Rawls's equality princi-
ple and the Armstrong admonition against laws that unfairly and unjustly
single out individuals to bear public burdens.
First, a property owner should not be required to bear the cost of a regu-
latory transfer unless a court finds that the owner's use of the property that
a regulation affects is either the sole or a contributing cause of the problem
that the regulation seeks to address, and there is a substantial likelihood that
the regulation will correct the problem.389
Second, a regulation effecting a wealth transfer that benefits the public
should fail if there is no (or little) linkage between the owner's use of prop-
erty and the goal a regulation seeks to achieve, and the government entity
386 John A. Humbach, A Unifying Theory for the Just-Compensation Cases: Takings,
Regulation and Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 250-51 (1982).
387 Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("Government hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished with-
out paying for every such change in the general law.").
388 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1004-05 (1984) (quoting United
States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)) ("Governmental action short
of acquisition of title or occupancy has been held, if its effects are so complete as to
deprive the owner of... most of his interest in the subject matter, to amount to a tak-
ing.").
389 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 n.4 (1987) (holding that
the Nollans cannot be "singled out to bear the burden of California's attempt to remedy
these problems [if] they had not contributed to it more than other coastal landowners");
see also id. at 837 ("[C]onstitutional propriety disappears ... if the [regulation] utterly
fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the [regulation]"). Alternatively,
if private property is connected to a societal need, a law that imposes an economic
burden on that class of private property is not a taking if the law addresses the need.
See United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119, 1138 (3d Cir. 1989); Goetz v. Glickman,
920 F. Supp. 1173, 1179 (D. Kan. 1996).
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seeks to create, "off-budget," some public program or project that targets
property owners rather than the public through taxes.3"
Finally, a regulatory transfer is an uncompensated taking if a relatively
small group of property owners uniquely experience a legal burden, persons
other than the affected property owner primarily enjoy the public gain re-
sulting from the law, and in-kind benefits flowing directly from the law's
implementation do not offset the burden. 91 Such a law is inconsistent with
the notion of fairness.392 Under these doctrines, if a government requires
that a property owner surrender to the public some incident of property
ownership that is more, and different, from that exacted from other members
of the public, the government action may be an uncompensated taking un-
less the burdened property owner enjoys a proportionate share of the bene-
fits.
393
C. Transfers to Another Property Owner or Identifiable Group
Another class of redistributive legislation that produces takings questions
is governmentally imposed wealth transfers of private property from one
private party or group of private parties to another. For example, rent con-
trol laws transfer wealth from landlords to tenants by reducing a landlord's
income and the tenants' monthly payments.394 Similarly, legislation de-
See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389-92 ('1994); Michael M. Berger,
Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes New Ground Rules for
Land-Use Planning, 20 URB. LAw. 735, 749 (1988); see also Pennell v. City of San
Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 22 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting
that such "off budget" wealth transfers occur with "relative invisibility and thus relative
immunity from normal democratic processes"); Surfside Colony v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 277 Cal. Rptr. 371, 376 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that an agency cannot
require a dedication of public access through a private beach as a condition for permis-
sion to build a rock revetment if construction of the revetment did not cause the need
for additional public access); Torres, supra note 59, at 15 (asserting that although the
government may arbitrate disputes between private actors, it may not "aggrandize" its
own position in relation to private actors) (citing Sax, supra note 15, at 62-64). If there
is a substantial connection between a proposed development of property and a problem
that will be addressed by imposing some exaction on a developer, a wealth transfer to
the public is permissible, especially if correction of the problem is not funded solely by
the developer. See Commercial Builders v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir.
1991).
391 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 147-48 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Great N. Ry. v. Cahill, 253 U.S. 71 (1920); Delaware, L. &
W.R. Co. v. Town of Morristown, 276 U.S. 182 (1928).
3 See supra Part IV.
3 See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893).
39 See Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54
BROOK. L.*REV. 741, 758-59 (1988).
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signed to prevent surface subsidence from mining may cause the value of
the mine property to decline while raising the value of surface proper-
ties.395
The government may act to bring about this kind of reallocation of
private rights when it believes that the existing private market will not sup-
port transactions that will lead to a state in which no possible change in
position would make one party better off without making another Worse
off.396 Market conditions supporting redistributive legislation occur if
policymakers perceive that an existing distribution of wealth is not optimal.
If these policymakers reject the notion that an existing distribution of wealth
is an entitlement, and if they believe that the current allocation of property
is so stagnant that normal private transactions will not move the society
closer to optimality, then redistributive legislation will be likely.397 A regu-
lation that rearranges an extant distribution of rights, assets, and liabilities
intends to supersede normal market mechanisms in order to force a transac-
tion that will benefit one party, and harm no one.3 98
Wealth transfers that take property from one category of private party
and give it to another category of private party likely violate the Rawls-
Armstrong "justice" component of the Takings Clause.39 9 Such laws have
two debilitating characteristics: (1) they deprive a property owner of an
incident of property ownership that otherwise would provide some benefit to
the owner, and (2) they transfer this incident of property ownership to
someone else who, as a consequence of the law, exercises property rights in
it.400 Both the deprivation and the transfer are unjust if a party deprived of
property did not cause the societal problem that a transfer seeks to alleviate.
1. Deprivation
If a class of property owners faces a possible regulation that will take
their property and give it to others, they likely will expend resources to
resist adoption of the redistributive legislation. This resistance may be par-
See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
3 This condition is known as Pareto optimality. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, ECONOMIC
FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW xi-xiv (1975).
See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 153-74 (1974).
398 The transferor is presumably not harmed by the resulting loss of wealth because
in the long run the benefited party will engage in transactions that benefit the transferor.
See generally DEAN J. MISCZYNSKI, Efficiency and Equity, in WINDFALLS FOR
WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION 142-46 (Donald G. Hagman &
Dean Misczynski eds., 1978).
3 See supra notes 370-73 and accompanying text.
o BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 130 (1977);
J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regu-
latory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 851, 937-38 (1996).
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ticularly fierce if those who a proposed regulation will burden do not be-
lieve that they are responsible for the condition that precipitated the political
demand for regulation. This expenditure by property owners dissipates over-
all wealth, reallocates resources away from economic investments, and en-
courages litigation and lobbying efforts.4"' Wealthy property owners then
are in a lose-lose scenario: If they do nothing, government action will de-
prive them of their property; if they resist, they will have to tap into their
wealth in order to pay for the costs of litigation and/or lobbying.
This result is completely inconsistent with the Locke-Madison belief that
a country will survive if its citizens have the opportunity to acquire wealth,
but that this opportunity exists only if the law assures some reliance and
continuity in property expectations.4" A legal system that requires continu-
ous property transfers among private parties thwarts planning, investment,
and security, and discourages wealth production." 3 The resulting demoral-
ization is particularly acute if the class of property owners saddled with the
exaction did not cause the societal evil that the government is addressing
through use of their property.
2. Transfer
Apart from the harm that the loss or threatened loss of private property
engenders, the coerced transfer itself also has two negative consequences.
First, compulsory redistribution of wealth assumes that need alone generates
an entitlement. 4' An institution of welfare based upon this premise ignores
the wishes of donors who may not consent to a forced transfer and perpetu-
ates a class of needy donees who, because they can rely on intervention by
the state, do not need to seek benefits directly from the rich. Second, this
type of wealth transfer permits governments to avoid the normal political
processes that make decisionmakers accountable for their actions. If a gov-
ernment does not use taxes to support the benefited class, and instead sin-
gles out certain property owners for this burden, it can proceed with relative
invisibility.0
In several cases, laws that effected a transfer of wealth from one class of
private parties to a limited class of private beneficiaries troubled the Su-
preme Court, especially if a causative link between the beneficiaries' need
401 See Richard A. Epstein, Taxation, Regulation, and Confiscation, 20 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 433, 441 (1982).
402 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 34 (P. Laslett ed. 1963); THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78. (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1963).
403 Rose, supra note 317, at 586. But see Rubenfeld, supra note 139, at 1141.
41 See Epstein, supra note 401, at 441.
" See Pennell v. Tri-County Apartment House Owners Ass'n, 485 U.S. 1, 22 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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and the transferor's property was missing, and the transferor did not receive
a reciprocal benefit from the transfer. Pennsylvania Coar is perhaps the
most obvious example of a case in which the Court found a law unconstitu-
tional in large part because it sought to transfer property rights from a class
of private parties (the coal companies whose mining resulted in surface
subsidence) to private beneficiaries (the surface owners). The statute hurt
mine owners as a class and helped surface owners as a class. Also, because
the beneficiaries of the statute were no more than a collection of private
interests, the law served no broad public interest. As a result, the burdened
mine owners failed to secure an average reciprocity of advantage. 7 Fur-
ther, a question exists as to whether the miners caused the harm associated
with surface subsidence: if surface owners built residences on the surface
after underground mining began, these surface dwellers may have caused
their own difficulties.
More recently, the Court explicitly has acknowledged that the Takings
Clause "is not necessarily limited to outright acquisitions by the government
for itself, [but may extend to a] case [in which] the Government has simply
imposed a general economic regulation which in effect transfers the property
interest from a private [owner] to a private [party].'"4" Other cases con-
firm that the just-compensation requirement may be triggered by a transfer
of private property to private beneficiaries, despite the language of the Tak-
ings Clause that seemingly limits its applicability to takings for a "public
use."4 "9 Justice Scalia argued in his partial dissent in Pennell that an un-
constitutional taking occurs when a regulation produces a wealth transfer to
a private party or parties, especially if the transfer singles out one group of
property owners to address an economic problem that is not their cre-
ation.41 The preferable, and constitutional, manner in which government
should correct the problem of economic inequities caused by society is
406 Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
407 See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. CT. REV.
1, 11-12; Rose, supra note 317, at 580-81.
If the transferor is "losing" a property interest that was not originally part of the
title (i.e., use of property to endanger public health and safety), a law that takes away
that use in order to benefit another group of private parties is not an uncompensated
taking of private property. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 491 n.20 (1987); M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1153 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
401 United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78 (1982) (emphasis added)
(citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)).
409 See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243-44 (1984).
410 Pennell, 485 U.S. at 21-22 (Scalia, J. dissenting); see also Azul Pacifico, Inc, v.
City of Los Angeles, 948 F.2d 575, 583 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a wealth transfer
from mobile park landlord to tenant constitutes a taking), withdrawn, 973 F.2d 704 (9th
Cir. 1992).
19971 425
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
through redistribution of wealth from the public to those in need. This ap-
proach squares with Armstrong's admonition that "public burdens...
should be borne by the public as a whole. 4
11
VII. CONCLUSION
The traditional test for an unconstitutional taking of property has two
prongs. The first asks whether the regulation prevents economically viable
use of the property subject to regulation, and the second considers whether
there is a sufficiently close fit between the regulatory means and ends.412
Recent lower court and Supreme Court cases have suggested that the second
prong's nexus requirement also should apply to a determination of whether
a regulated property owner should bear a regulatory burden. Under the Tak-
ings Clause, a government allocates burdens improperly if it singles out an
impacted property owner to bear the cost of a regulation, despite the fact
that the owner's use of property did not cause the problem that the regula-
tion addresses. Although this causation test is not a perfect predictor of
when laws work unconstitutional takings, 13 its routine application to regu-
lations affecting property should help to prevent the unfairness and injustice
of government rules that select from the private sector convenient targets to
pay for benefits for which the public should be responsible.
411 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
42 Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
413 See Note, supra note 70, at 455-65.
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